ISLAMABAD – Year 2017, ended with the commitment by Pakistan to acquiredeterrence at all spectrums of threat. At the meeting of National Commandand Control Authority, Pakistan resolved to policy of Full SpectrumDeterrence, which is in line with the policy of Credible MinimumDeterrence.
So, to validate its commitment for countering threats at all spectrums,Pakistan marked the beginning of 2018 with the test of naval missile“Harba”. On January 03, 2018 Pakistan successfully tested its indigenousnaval cruise missile “Harba” from its newly commissioned fast attack vessel“PNS Himmat”.
Harba is capable of hitting its target from surface-to-surface and is alsocapable of ground assault. Moreover, it has demonstrated impressivecapability in accuracy and precision by hitting its target successfully.
This particular development by Pakistan Navy was not only an attempt to getanother weapon in its arsenal but to exhibit its self-sufficiency inhigh-tech weaponry.Another significant aspect of this particular development is Pakistan’sindigenously built naval vessel “PNS Himmat” which was commissioned in year2017.
PNS Himmat is equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry, sensors and Harbacruise missiles. It is the second indigenously built fast attack vesselwhich is capable of high speed, high fire power and enhanced endurance forrapid response at sea.
The first indigenously built fast attack vessel by Pakistan was PNSDehshat, which was inducted in to Pakistan Navy in 2012. These developmentsby Pakistan in its naval capabilities were due since long time. Moreover,with interest vested in Gwadar Port and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(COEC) state level initiatives to strengthen Pakistan Navy for security ofmaritime borders and interests are increasing.
However, rapid initiatives to strengthen navy is not entirely for the sakeof economic Interests. With India being its neighbour, Pakistan was notfortunate enough to spend a lot on its economic growth. Rather securitythreats from India engulfed Pakistan’s resources.
But, if Pakistan’s security choices are analyzed with pragmatic lens, whatother choice was available for Pakistan? None, but to face India with allits ability.
On the other hand, in realm of naval militarization and nuclearisation,India is spending huge amount on indigenously building SSBNs and SSNs alongwith aircraft carriers and fleet of naval vessels. This rapidmilitarization by India is destabilizing Pak-India strategic equilibrium inthe Indian Ocean.
Almost a year ago, Pakistan didn’t even have a second strike capabilitybecause of its unyielding belief in credible minimum deterrence. However,in response to Indian naval capabilities and its ambitious, Pakistan wentfor the option of second strike capability. It was an attempt to strengthenthe deterrence and shared risk of destruction to keep India at bay.
But, nuclear tipped naval cruise missile is not end of the ladder in secondstrike capability rather it is start of the ladder. One of the key elementsin making deterrence reliable is complementary conventional force. Decisionto build naval missile system by Pakistan for conventional fast attackvessel supports reinforces the logic that Pakistan is not only buildingsecond strike capability but also complementing it with conventional force.
Point to focus on is that Pakistan’s decision was based on the logic thatPakistan wants to stop India at all spectrums whether it be conventional ornon-conventional. Furthermore, Pakistan does not always rely on nucleardeterrence to stop India, if it’s possible to avoid reliance on onlynuclear weapons, conventional means are preferred for regional peace andstability.
In addition, Pakistan’s second-strike capability is based on nuclear tippedcruise missiles Babur 3. Thus, conversion of naval cruise missile intonuclear tipped naval cruise missile is the possibility that Pakistan couldrely on in future to deter India.
Deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on naval vessels is plausible optionfor Pakistan to counter Indian threat in Indian Ocean Region. Asutilization of other options such as acquisition of SSBN and SSN is a timetaking process.
These measures are the options Pakistan may rely on till the development ofsurvivable and credible second-strike capability. However, in all thismayhem for acquisition of Second Strike Capability, the logic of nucleardeterrence should prevail to avoid catastrophe and destruction.
As, it is deterrence that instills the fear of unbearable damage andencourages states to not manipulate the shared risks of destruction. IfIndia and Pakistan want to use the Indian Ocean Region for economicprosperity they need to let deterrence prevail.
Lastly, deployment of cannisterised nuclear assets in Indian Ocean Regionwill require certain amount of confidence building measures by both Indiaand Pakistan to avoid nuclear crisis.
Ayousha Khan— The writer is Research Associate at Strategic VisionInstitute, a think-tank based in Islamabad.