NEW DELHI- Iranians are well-known for their sense of diplomacy andprofessional diplomats are even, at times, experts at confusing theirinterlocutors. On March 13, Iran’s minister of foreign affairs, JavadZarif, paid an official visit to Islamabad in order to pacify thePakistanis after Hassan Rouhani’s three-day trip to India the month before— the first Iranian presidential visit since 2003.
Zarif said: “Our relations with India, just like Pakistan’s relations withSaudi Arabia, are not against Pakistan as we understand Pakistan’srelations with Saudi Arabia are not against Iran.” Such a circumnavigatedsentence captures the tactical finesse of Tehran, but India may beuncomfortable with the resilience of Iran-Pakistan relations.
Rouhani’s visit certainly symbolised the India-Iran rapprochement, that wasconcretised by the leasing to New Delhi — for 18 months — of theoperational control of phase 1 of the Chabahar port, through which Indianwheat was sent to Afghanistan in October 2017.
At last, New Delhi got access to Central Asia via Iran. During Rouhani’svisit, Prime Minister Narendra Modilink> declared that India “willsupport the construction of the Chabahar-Zahedan rail link so that Chabahargateway’s potential could be fully utilised. We want to expandconnectivity, cooperation in the energy sector and the centuries-oldbilateral relationship.” That was already the official Indian line duringModi’s 2016 visit to Tehran when India, Iran and Afghanistan signed atrilateral transport agreement.
But this rapprochement does not mean that Iran is willing to distanceitself from Pakistan. In fact, Iran seems to play one country against theother in order to maximise its gains in the context of sanctions which arebadly affecting its economy. Such a strategy is facilitated by Pakistan’sattitude, which tries hard not to alienate Iran.
Both countries share a 900 km-long border that cuts across Balochistan, adoubly disturbed province: Pakistani Baloch, who have been fighting aguerrilla war for 10 years, could get support from Iran — or Indian spies.For Islamabad, according to a Dawn oped, Pakistan’s sovereignty wasviolated under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter when Kulbhushan Jadhavlink> used Iranian territoryto illegally enter Pakistan.
Skirmishes have multiplied since 2016 when Iranian border guards reportedlyfired mortar shells into Pakistan territory. Pakistan can hardly afford toopen a third front. Second, Iran and Pakistan have also a common neighbour,Afghanistan, where they could intensify a proxy war. Third, Pakistan needsgas, Iran needs to sell its gas.
To display its goodwill, Pakistan’s army chief paid a three-day visit toTehran in October last year, the same month when India was using Chabaharto supply wheat to Afghanistan. Such a visit had not taken place for 20years. The Iranians were responsive, partly because of what General Bajwahad to offer (cooperation on missile technology was discussed), partlybecause of their interest in joining the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative(BRI) by branching out the gas pipeline they have already built on the CPECat Gwadar.
Iran sees Chinese investments in Pakistan as an economic opportunity,whereas India makes a point not to take part in the BRI. While Indiaconceived Chabahar as the best means to balance Gwadar, the Iranians wantto connect both and Javad Zarif said in Islamabad that Iran has offeredPakistan and China the opportunity to participate in Chabahar.
Zarif also thanked Pakistan for helping Iran fight terrorism, somethingthat directly contradicts the Indian narrative. Dozens of Iranian borderguards have been killed since 2013 and, therefore, Zarif expressed hisappreciation when attempted suicide blasts were foiled by the Pakistan army.
Last but not least, Iran is not comfortable with India because of itsstrategic partnership with the US at a time when Donald Trump is preparedto restore the sanctions his predecessor had started to lift. Iran hasdisapproved of the Afghan policy of the new American administration thatIndia has applauded. Similarly, Iran cannot take lightly the newIndia-Israel relations. It is these growing affinities that havecontributed in the last few months to Ali Khamenei mentioning the Kashmirissue in some of his sermons for the first time and comparing it to theinjustice meted out to Palestinians.
The deepening of Iran-Pakistan relations will depend on the pressure Riyadhexerts on Islamabad.
Riyadh activates the Salafi groups that have developed since the 1980s inPakistan: The formidable network of Saudi/GCC-supported madrasas play amajor role there, along with Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith and other Islamistorganisations. In response, the Pakistanis have made important concessionsto Saudi Arabia and the GCC.
former Pakistan army chief, Raheel Sharif, was appointed the leader of theRiyadh-based Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (a coalition ofSunni countries) in 2017. Third, the Pakistani army and Saudi Royal LandForces have increased their joint manoeuvres. Last but not least, whilePakistan has not sent troops to Yemen, its soldiers have been deployed onthe other side of the border, allegedly to protect the holy cities.
Pakistan has tried not to take sides between Iran and Saudi Arabia and evenattempted to mediate between the two. But not taking sides may not be anoption for long and for the moment, the Saudis seem to have an upper hand.Not only did Nawaz Sharif meet members of the Saudi royal family afterresigning as PM to discuss his successor, but soon after Raheel Sharifplayed a role in the “purge” instigated by Mohammed bin Salman.
However, whether frosty relations between Iran and Pakistan will result ina more rapid rapprochement between Iran and India remains to be seen. Afterall, the country Tehran tries to relate to via CPEC is China and that maybe why New Delhi finds it so difficult to deal with Iran. The developmentof Chabahar is slow but so, for instance, is the finalisation of thecontract regarding a gas field, Farzad-B, in which India is interested,showing that Iran is not an easy partner indeed. Indian Express
By: Jaffrelot is a senior research fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Parisand professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King’s India Institute,London.