NEW DELHI – India’s decision to go ahead with the purchase of S-400 AirDefence System from Russia is the right way to maintain its strategicautonomy. The country’s military capability development at the momenthinges on acquisition of key technologies from the West, the US, Russia andIsrael which it must maintain. It is a forgone conclusion that militarycapability is the most arbitrary visible power that has the potential toshape international relations and it loses relevance if a nation succumbsto military or diplomatic coercion.

No nation can create a favourable international environment unless it has astrong military and a modern military industrial complex to leveragecapabilities to secure its vital national interests. Thus, diversificationin acquisition of weapon systems assumes significance and is a leverage tomaintain the military and strategic balance.

What are the options available to India at this stage? The choice is eitherto wait for domestic defence research to develop technology to make withinIndia or have the choice to acquire weapons and systems from the nationthat the country wishes to interact with to modernise military to preparefor future challenges.

There are two fundamental issues that need to be examined critically here.First, maintaining strategic autonomy and choice to procure systems thatsuits India’s operational requirements. Second, there is no scope thatIndia should surrender its choice of acquisition of the most suitablesystem because hardware modernisation is based on national securitystrategy and military doctrines.

Import of weapon systems should not be looked at as a foreign policy toolto re-calibrate relations with the US, Russia and other powers. India isfacing long-term threats from Pakistan, China and other asymmetric forcesand it cannot afford coercion from other nations in building its militarycapabilities.

What makes one nation militarily more powerful than others? The answer isits economy, modern military industrial complex and a modern army. Theultimate objective of a nation should be to develop its own militaryindustrial complex that is able to develop niche technology to secure adecisive edge during war. Till we are able to develop advance systemsdomestically, India has no other option but to acquire systems from nationsthat can bridge the capability gap between India and its adversaries.

There is little choice that India has today considering the requirement ofmilitary hardware. On the one side, India needs access to Westerntechnology from the US that could transform the Armed Forces into a modernfighting machine, and on the other it needs continuity to the systems ofSoviet origin that has served armed forces well during war and peace.Replacing Soviet/ Russian hardware is economically and strategically nearimpossible since most of the equipment may be in their last stages of theirlives but are still fit for war and capabilities. Some also argue thatthese lives can be enhanced by upgradation.

India was completely dependent upon the former Soviet Union for developmentof military capabilities and modernisation of its armed forces. However,post the fragmentation of Soviet Union, the Armed Forces suffered a setbackin modernisation due to non-availability of strategic partners that couldfill the capability gaps. It was not easy to switch entirely from onesystem to another because some Soviet origin systems required upgradationand some required supply of spares.

It was at that juncture a decision was taken to diversify the futureacquisition of weapon and electronic warfare systems to two to threereliable partners to create alternative avenues so that if one failed,others could step in during a war or crisis.

Today, in addition to Russia, India is importing weapons and systems fromUS, Europe, and Israel. Diversification has brought in competitiveness andcontractual accountability. A major factor in weapons procurement istimelines, in-service cost, transfer of technology and willingness of anation to sell the technology to build domestic military industrialinfrastructure. The dichotomy is that Russia is prepared to transfertechnology but in most cases not ready to sell this technology.

In spite of this, Russia still continues to be the ‘Most Favoured Partner’and has even leased nuclear submarines to India which no other nation wasprepared to do so. S-400 Air Defence System with the range of 40 to 400 Kmis capable of engaging multiple targets simultaneously and is consideredunmatched today. Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ofthe US is a very good system but not as versatile as S-400. Similarly, theSpike anti-tank missile of Israel is one of the best in the world that canbe fired from multiple platforms at long ranges.

Considering the dynamic nature of international relations where nationalinterests are permanent in nature, putting all our eggs in one basket maybe a bad strategy to pursue.

Principle of acquisition should be affordable, reliable, timely deliveryand technologically superior system able to serve for long period with orwithout upgradation. Every acquisition either from the US, Russia or Israelshould add to the technological base of domestic military industrialcomplexes and the ultimate objective of accumulation of a cross section oftechnology should lead to strong technological foundation for ‘Make inIndia’ projects. India also needs to develop its holistic militarycapability by a mix of imports from more than one nation and focus ondeveloping certain niche technology domestically.

For this it could look for partnerships with Japan and Israel in the fieldof electronic warfare, laser, unmanned aerial systems and radars.

Michael Beckley in his article ‘Economic Development and MilitaryEffectiveness’ concluded that empirical studies have found that militarypower influences patterns of international cooperation, trade policy,economic development, and, of course, war causation and termination.Keeping this in mind, India should not succumb to the sanctions of the USgovernment for exercising its choice to build military capabilities.

*BY: Narender Kumar, The author is senior fellow at the Centre for LandWarfare Studies. *