NEW DELHI – Now, as “the tumult and the shouting dies” over the Wuhansummit between Modi and Xi, two major questions remain: first, why wereIndia-China relations in need of a “reset” after some 10 meetings betweenModi and Xi over the last four years? Second, what have been the tangibleoutcomes, if any, of Wuhan?
The answer to the first question — why was a “reset” necessary? — is asad commentary on the handling of foreign policy since Modi took over onMay 26, 2014. He so personalised foreign policy, marginalising as neverbefore his own External Affairs Minister, the hapless Sushma Swaraj, andoutsourcing the making of foreign policy to a retired police officer, AjitDoval, with Foreign Secretary Jaishankar acting as a handmaiden to theNational Security Adviser, that professionalism was given the go-by.In consequence, our China policy was handled so incompetently thatnotwithstanding sharing a swing on the banks of the Sabarmati and Xireceiving Modi personally at the airport in his hometown of Xian, ourbilateral relations with China dipped steeply even as the Chinese footprintall over South Asia spread from Nepal in the high Himalayas to Maldives atthe crossroads of the Indian Ocean. Not only were bilateral tensionsratcheted up, “irritants” multiplied such as the Modi *sarkar* meretriciouslyboycotting the May 2017 international summit gathering in Beijing to launchthe Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) attended by almost everyone else whomatters (whether or not they went along with the Initiative).
Then came Doklam just a few weeks after BRI, and everything went spinningout of Modi’s control. Modi, at that stage, withdrew from the frontlines,for once allowing the Foreign Office’s China experts, specifically theafore-mentioned Jaishankar and our then Ambassador in China, the fluentMandarin-speaking Vijay Gokhale, now Foreign Secretary, to take overdiplomatic management. In consequence, the crisis was defused, but not tillever-friendly Bhutan was given the fright of its life, losing India bothregard and influence in that country, and allowing Pakistan a smirk.
Xi Jinping is no need of serial hugging and photo ops. He and hisgovernment seek instant recourse to mechanisms set up during Rajiv Gandhi’struly historic visit to Beijing in 1988.
Rattled by the prospect of a mini-1962, Modi backed off — which was justas well because Xi is no need of serial hugging and photo ops. He and hisgovernment seek instant recourse to mechanisms set up during Rajiv Gandhi’struly historic visit to Beijing in 1988, and subsequent steps such as theagreement on peace and tranquillity on the border negotiated by the PVNarasimha Rao government. Indeed, the Chinese must have wondered at theextremely casual manner in which the 2015 supplementary steps, concludedwith China by Modi himself three years ago in 2015 to give additional teethto the 2013 Manmohan-negotiated Border Defence Cooperation Agreement, werebeing implemented, such as the inexplicable and unforgiveable failure to”operationalize the hotline between the two Military Headquarters” agreedupon all of a thousand days ago, and the failure to assiduously adhere tothe commitment to “annual visits by delegations from the MilitaryHeadquarters and neighbouring military commands”.
The lesson to be learned is that when Modi takes it upon himself topersonalise foreign policy, disaster strikes; when Foreign Serviceprofessionals are left to get on with the job, they find solutions.
As for the second question — what are the “outcomes” of Wuhan? — the sadanswer is “Nothing”. Realising that beyond soothing words, and theacknowledgement of China’s dominance in India-China relations, there wouldbe nothing to report, the BJP-RSS fielded their most articulate crisismanager, Ram Madhav, to cover Modi’s retreat by proclaiming inlink>*TheIndian Expresslink>*,even before Wuhan quite got underway, “This meeting is not’outcome-centric’, it is ‘understanding-centric’.”
Oh, yeah? So perfect was the post-Wuhan “understanding” between Xi and Modithat the two leaders were unable to even issue a joint statement. Each sideissued its own press release and the difference in tone and substance isembarrassingly palpable.
The Indian document refers in capital letters to “Closer DevelopmentPartnership”: the Chinese press release simply ignores this.
The Indian document stresses “the common threat posed by terrorism”. TheChinese statement says nothing about terrorism being a “common threat”;indeed, it does not think India’s primary foreign affairs concern andpriority, namely, “terrorism”, is even worthy of a passing mention. Anyhope of Modi leaning on Xi to modify China’s veto on Masood Azhar beingdesignated a UN-recognised terrorist is thus dashed to the ground. The”irritants” remain, the scratching at scabs continues.
As for the other “irritant”, Modi’s desperate quest for membership of theNuclear Suppliers Group in the face of China’s adamant refusal tocountenance this, Xi had Modi so overawed into silence that the Indianssaid nothing about NSG, and the Chinese said nothing. Clearly Modi’smuch-vaunted charm and charisma have serious limitations.
Amusingly, while any mention of Nehru is anathema to the Modi Doctrine,and, therefore the Indian press release makes no mention of Panchsheel, theChinese emblazon in their release “the fine norms enshrined in the FivePrinciples of Peaceful Coexistence” and go on to describe the FivePrinciples (first “enshrined” in the 1954 India-China agreement on Tibet –another anathema to Modi and his ilk) as “a stellar example of jointinitiatives by the two countries”. How much more pointed could the politeChinese get to saying that Modi is no Nehru!
As for Team Modi’s boast that Xi has agreed to holding a second “informalround” of Wuhan-like talks in India next year, the Chinese have confinedthemselves to saying “the leaders of the two countries will continue tomaintain strategic communication in various forums”. Various forums? Noteven a hint of pursuing the agenda-less Wuhan informal bilateral track atsummit level? The Chinese press release does not endorse the Indian claimthat Modi and Xi “highly assessed the opportunity for direct, free andcandid exchange of views offered by the Informal Summit”, nor with thewholly Indian claim that they “agreed on the utility of holding more suchdialogues”. Evidently, after the hair-raising experience of Wuhan, theChinese have become wary of Modi’s preference for personalised diplomacy inscenic settings to provide media fodder for domestic electoral compulsions.They dislike diplomacy as event management.
The Chinese had agreed to accommodate Modi’s eccentricities not to have anoutcomes-*mukt*summit as Ram Madhav insists, but in the expectation, asChinese Vice Minister Kong Xuanyou put it on the eve of Wuhan, that thesummit would “set new goals and break new ground” (Xinhua, 24 April). On 26April, the day before the summit, the Chinese official spokesperson, Ms HuaChunying, was crystal clear about Chinese expectations: a “new startingpoint”, not an “understanding-centric” meeting. The government-controlledChinese press was blunter still. *The Global Times*, the Chinesegovernment’s English mouthpiece, expected Wuhan to be “as significant” asRajiv’s meeting with Deng in 1988. *The China Daily* hoped Wuhan would”live up to its billing as an unprecedented meeting”.
In the event, Wuhan proved a damp squib. All it “achieved” (if “achieved”is the right word) was Xi putting Modi in his place and reiterating theneed to get on with sincerely implementing everything already achieved overthree decades from Rajiv Gandhi through Narasimha Rao and Atal BehariVajapayee to Manmohan Singh.
Metaphorically slapping Modi on the wrist, Xi subtly reminded Modi that theworld did not begin on May 26, 2014, in the muted hope that Modi would geton with building on his predecessors’ achievements instead of strutting his56-inch chest across the world stage. Unfortunately, Modi is so obsessedwith himself that the Chinese are left praying that come the next generalelections, they will have a serious PM to engage with in New Delhi.
By: Mani Shankar Ayiar