ISLAMABAD – Historically speaking, the India-Iran relationship had its upsand downs during the decades under the Shah of Iran’s rule. The lowestpoint was reached when during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, Pakistaniair force jets were stationed in Iran to gain ‘strategic depth’ vis-a-visthe IAF.
However, after the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran adopted an explicitlyanti-Western foreign policy and began viewing India as a natural ally.
The ideology-based regime rooted in the principles of justice, freedom andresistance was greatly attracted by India’s freedom struggle, non-alignedpolicies, and the sheer grit to preserve its strategic autonomy.
This perceived affinity withstood the changes and shifts in Delhi’s foreignpolicy outlook in the post-Cold war era.
Tehran was not unduly perturbed when the India-US relationship took anupward curve in the nineties during the Bill Clinton administration or whenthe 2008 nuclear deal was concluded or, even when Washington and Delhibegan chanting their ‘defining partnership of the 21st century’ during theBarack Obama administration.link
Tehran remained confident about India’s DNA anchored on the country’sstrategic autonomy. This confidence took a beating when India voted for thefirst time in February 2006 in favour of a West-led resolution at theInternational Atomic Energy Agency, which reported against Iran to the UNsecurity council and, again, in November 2009 when India voted in favour ofa resolution spearheaded by the US at the IAEA censuring Tehran over itscontroversial nuclear programme and demanding that it stop uraniumenrichment.
Nonetheless, life moved on. There was no apparent rancour.
This much needs to be recalled to put in perspective the highly criticalremarks by Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif recently whilemeeting a group of visiting journalists from New Delhi, regarding the Modigovernment’s pusillanimous attitude under American pressure to roll backcooperation with Tehran.
Zarif said Tehran had expected the Modi government to be ‘more resilient’in the face of Washington’s bullying. Zarif speculated that India probably’did not want to agitate’ the US by being a sanctions spoiler and he addedwith biting sarcasm, ‘People want to be on the right side of PresidentTrump’, but the problem is ‘he hasn’t got a right side’.
Equally, Zarif regretted that Modi government was dragging its feet on theChabahar port project, which has far-reaching implications for regionalconnectivity, stability and security.
The Iranian government media widely reported Zarif’s remarks, which mostcertainly reflect the deep misgivings at the highest level of Iranianleadership that India’s capacity or political will to pursue independentforeign policies is increasingly in doubt.
To be sure, Zarif’s remarks must also be seen in the backdrop of the Modigovernment’s fawning attitude toward Saudi Arabia lately. There is noempirical evidence to suggest that Riyadh laid pre-conditions for CrownPrince Mohammed bin Salman’s embrace of Modi.
In fact, Saudi-Iranian rivalry is far too complex to be reduced to azero-sum mindset. After all, Riyadh is robustly advancing cooperation withRussia and China despite these two countries having thriving strategicpartnerships with Iran.
Indian analysts tend to link the Modi government’s dalliance with SaudiArabia and the deepening chill in Indian-Iranian relations. Indeed, theModi government has relegated cooperation with Iran to the back burner. Itis no secret, of course, that Washington encourages third countries toreplace Iranian crude with Saudi supplies.
The Modi government is pinning hopes on massive Saudi investments in India.During the crown prince’s visit to India in February, he forecast Saudiinvestments to the tune of $100 billion during the next two-year period.The Indian side has been daydreaming since then about big Saudi investmentsin the Ratnagiri petrochemical project and in Reliance Industries.
While the Ratnagiri project is in limbo, Reliance is keeping its fingerscrossed. Modi’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia can be viewed in this context.
How realistic are the Indian expectations? Clearly, Saudi Arabia itselfneeds to attract outside investment. Lacklustre oil prices have caused thecountry’s budget deficit to widen. The budget deficit would be in theregion of $36 billion in 2018 and 2019, and may widen to $50 billion in2020. Saudi Aramco’s IPO itself is for raising money for funding the crownprince’s ambitious programme of economic and social reforms (‘Vision 2030’).
CNBC recently featured an interview with former CIA director General DavidH Petraeus (who presently heads the KKR Global Institute, which providesconsultancy to American companies active in the Middle East) regardingSaudi Arabia’s economic malaise. Some excerpts are worth noting:
‘It’s a fact that Saudi Arabia is gradually running out of money, they’d bethe first to acknowledge that the sovereign wealth fund has been reduced,it’s somewhere below $500 billion now.’
‘The (*budget*) deficits each year, depending on the price of Brent crude,can be anywhere from $40 billion to $60 billion depending on some of theiractivities in countries in the region.’
‘The bottom line is that they need the money, they need that outsideinvestment that is crucial to delivering ‘Vision 2030′ which cannot berealised without outside investment, this is just one component of a numberof different initiatives that they’re pursuing to try to attract thatoutside investment.’
The prospects aren’t bright for Reliance and Ratnagiri to pin hopes onSaudi investment. The crown prince’s priority is ‘Vision 2030’ — and itremains a hard sell.
Put differently, neglecting India’s cooperation with Iran, especially theChabahar port development, for the sake of a chimerical Saudi bonanza canonly find the Modi government falling between two stools eventually.linklink
India cannot, should not and need not substitute Saudi Arabia as apreferred partner to Iran or vice versa.
Why keep at arm’s length a regional power in our extended neighbourhood whois manifestly eager to foster cooperation with India?
Such attitude is illogical, myopic and cramps India’s diplomatic options inthe Persian Gulf. – Reddit
BY: Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar