The Washington Post article, published on 12 November 2025, outlinesseveral important developments and allegations along the India-Chinaborder.Here are the major points:
1.
Quiet territorial shifts via buffer zones – The article says that after the deadly 2020 clash between Indian and Chinese forces in Ladakh, India and China resumed trade and flights — but behind the diplomatic calm, the critics say that China has used newly established “buffer zones” to restrict Indian patrols in areas India formerly accessed. – A retired Indian lieutenant-general quoted in the article said:
“Some of the buffer zones created are mostly in areas previously patrolled by us and on our side.”
– One village official from Chushul in Ladakh is quoted claiming ~450 sq km in his “constituency alone” was converted into a buffer zone, land that “belonged to India, but now our soldiers cannot set foot there.” 2.
Loss of access and patrol points – The article cites a 2022 report that Indian forces no longer had a presence at 26 of 65 former patrolling points in a given region. – It emphasises that this is not simply “salami slicing” (a gradual incremental approach) but, in the words of another retired general, “they actually took the whole belly of the pork.” 3.
Government opacity and narrative – The Indian government’s responses are described as “opaque” — avoiding clear admissions of territorial loss, while stating that agreements are “temporary and limited”. – One former Indian ambassador to China calls the silence an intentional strategy:
“If you don’t put it out in the public domain, then you don’t need to defend it publicly.”
4.
Strategic-military implications – Analysts say that while there is engagement and dialogue between India and China, if India allows these newly established groundrealities (buffer zones with restricted Indian patrol) to become entrenched, Chinacould gain de facto permanent advantage. – The article cautions that while normalisation is underway (flights, trade, meetings), the underlying border issue has not been resolved — and the creeping changes may accumulate into long-term disadvantage.
——————————What this implies: “India lost a massive territory”?
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The phrasing “India lost a massive territory” may be somewhat imprecise,but the article strongly suggests that India’s access to ground and patrolrights in certain areas has been significantly curtailed, which de factomeans territorial control is shifting.
– By giving up or being blocked from areas they used to patrol, Indian forces effectively have less “control” on the ground, even if formal “sovereignty” remains in dispute. – The conversion of areas formerly patrolled by India into buffer zones where India cannot operate means that China’ advantage increases—and India’s ability to assert its claims reduces. – While the article does not give a specific aggregate number for total square kilometres lost in this piece, it gives enough individual accounts (450 sq km in one area, 26 of 65 patrol points inaccessible) to indicate the scale is large.
So yes — from the Washington Post’s perspective, India may not haveformally ceded “massive territory” in the sense of a negotiated treatyhanding land over, but the facts on the ground suggest a significantterritorial disadvantage.——————————Key areas of concern
– Some of the most sensitive zones cited include the sectors around Pangong Tso (Lake) and the Depsang/Chusul regions in Ladakh. – The creation of buffer zones: areas where neither side formally patrols, but which are on India’s previously claimed/patrolled side. – The change in India’s patrolling behaviour: from routinely accessing numerous “Patrol Points” to being restricted or barred in many of them.
——————————Why this matters
– Ground-truth matters: In high altitude border warfare, what matters is who actually patrols, occupies, and controls the forward terrain. Losing patrol points means losing strategic depth, surveillance, and deterrence. – Strategic ramifications: If India allows its control to shrink, China can utilise the advantage to densify infrastructure, force deployments, and logistics in the high ground—all of which favour the side with access. – Diplomatic cost: If the border status quo keeps shifting and India does not publicly acknowledge or take strong steps, the changed facts become harder to reverse. – Domestic politics: The article suggests local resentment among Ladakhi communities who feel their grazing lands, access and local rights are being undermined. This may challenge India’s internal legitimacy in the border zones.
——————————Caveats and counter-points
– The article also notes that Indian officials deny having lost any territory, and say that agreements (patrol, disengagement) are “temporary and limited”. – Some former military officers say that Chinese troops “have also lost access” to previous positions, so the picture is not unambiguously one-sided. – The exact measurement of “how much land” has been lost or is inaccessible remains disputed and not fully verifiable (due to restricted access to many frontline areas). – The article emphasises “de facto” shifts in control rather than a formal treaty or definitive cession of sovereignty.