Tel Aviv / New Delhi — India and Israel on 4 November 2025 formalised a broad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) during the 17th India–Israel Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting on defence cooperation. The agreement lays out an expanded framework for joint research, technology sharing, co-development and co-production across science & technology, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber security, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and advanced weapons.
Below we explain what the MoU covers, why it matters strategically, and — looking at the capabilities Israel is already supplying to New Delhi — what the agreement could mean for Pakistan in the (admittedly worst-case) scenario of a major India–Pakistan war. What the MoU actually covers
The MoU is deliberately broad and speaks to three mutually reinforcing goals: deepen strategic dialogue and joint training, expand defence-industrial cooperation (joint R&D, co-production), and accelerate transfer and integration of cutting-edge capabilities — explicitly listing areas such as science & technology, AI, cyber security, unmanned aerial systems and advanced weapon systems. Both sides emphasised cooperation to “enable sharing of advanced technology and promote co-development and co-production.”
Independent defence outlets covering the JWG highlighted that the new pact is less about a single purchase and more about building integrated supply, design and sustainment chains — Israeli firms working with Indian manufacturers on sensors, autonomy, electronic warfare and precision munitions. Why Israel matters to India: the current baseline
Israel has been one of India’s most important defence partners for more than a decade. SIPRI data and numerous reports show that India was a major destination for Israeli arms during 2020–24, and Israeli systems — radars, surveillance and combat UAVs, weaponised loitering munitions and missile systems — are already in Indian service. That supplier relationship has, in recent years, shifted from one-off purchases to long-term industrial partnerships and licensed co-production.
Analysts note that the new MoU formalises and expands those patterns: rather than simply buying finished systems, India and Israel will pursue joint R&D and Indian production lines — which increases India’s ability to acquire, integrate and domestically sustain Israeli technologies at scale. How the MoU could change battlefield dynamics (if war with Pakistan occurred)
1. More capable, integrated ISR and targeting AI cyber sensors = better situational awareness. Closer cooperation on AI and sensors can accelerate India’s ability to fuse ISR (satellite, airborne, ground radars and UAV feeds) into faster, more precise targeting cycles. That matters most for long-range strike and counter-force operations — it reduces the time between detection and weapon delivery and complicates Pakistan’s efforts to hide or disperse high-value assets.
2. Unmanned systems and loitering munitions at scale Israel is a leading producer of loitering munitions and armed UAVs. Those systems have already been used in recent India–Pakistan skirmishes where both sides relied heavily on UAS. In 2025 clashes, reporting indicated use of precision loitering munitions such as the Israeli HAROP family and other strike drones — weapons that can conduct low-risk, precision attacks against hardened or time-sensitive targets. If co-production and technology transfer accelerate, India could field larger numbers and indigenise sustainment, increasing operational tempo for unmanned strike and suppression missions.
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3. Improved air-defence and electronic warfare (EW) mixes Israeli systems include high-quality radars, fire-control and electronic-warfare suites. Combined with AI-based sensor fusion, India could tighten integrated air-defence webs that make some classes of missile and UAS strikes harder and push adversaries toward larger or costlier strike profiles. At the same time, greater cyber cooperation increases both offensive and defensive options in the electromagnetic and information domains.
4. Sustainment and co-production reduce chokepoints An MoU that emphasises co-production reduces reliance on foreign deliveries and makes it easier to scale up during prolonged conflict. That matters because supply chains and spare-parts constraints can limit the operational life of high-tech systems in wartime. The MoU’s industrial elements therefore make Israeli technologies more likely to be produced and maintained inside India. What Pakistan is likely to do in response
Pakistan has already accelerated partnerships with China and Turkey and invested in indigenous drone programs following recent clashes; Reuters reporting has noted an uptick in Pakistani efforts to develop and procure UAS and counter-UAS capabilities. Islamabad’s options include: expand air-defence and EW systems, invest further in cheap mass UAS and kamikaze drones, deepen Chinese and Turkish technology transfers, and harden critical infrastructure and dispersal measures to blunt precision strikes. Risks and limits
– Technology transfer is not instantaneous. Co-development timelines for complex systems (AI-enabled C2, missiles, integrated EW suites) are measured in years, not weeks. The immediate battlefield impact is therefore contingent on procurement speed and production scale. – Countermeasures proliferate. As one side fields new systems, the other side adapts with decoys, camouflage, EW and proliferated cheaper drones — which can blunt tactical advantages. Reuters coverage of recent skirmishes shows both sides experimenting with such tradeoffs. – Escalation and diplomacy. The transfer of advanced capabilities raises the political stakes in a crisis; adversaries may adjust force postures or seek third-party political remedies to avoid rapid escalation.
The 17th India–Israel JWG MoU institutionalises and broadens what has been a fast-growing India-Israel defence partnership. It moves the relationship closer to long-term technology partnerships and co-production in AI, cyber, UAS and advanced weapons — areas that matter most for modern, high-intensity conflict. For Pakistan, the short-to-medium-term implications are clear: India could gain faster ISR-to-strike cycles, larger fleets of sophisticated unmanned strike platforms, and more resilient sustainment for advanced systems — all of which will shape Islamabad’s procurement, doctrine and deterrent calculations. But technology alone does not determine outcomes; countermeasures, asymmetric offsets, diplomatic pressures and time required for co-production will temper how quickly any capability advantage translates into decisive battlefield effects. ——————————
Author is former DIG Police of GB and Director FIA.