ISLAMABAD: In May 2025, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) once againdemonstrated the decisive impact of its advanced electronic warfare (EW)capabilities during a brief but intense aerial confrontation with theIndian Air Force (IAF) along the Line of Control. Triggered by heightenedborder tensions and alleged cross-border incidents, the episode saw PAFassets employ sophisticated electromagnetic spectrum control to disruptIndian radar coverage, communications networks, and command coordination.This non-kinetic dominance enabled precise Pakistani counter-actions whileseverely limiting Indian offensive options, resulting in a clearoperational advantage for Pakistan and reinforcing the strategic lessonsdrawn from the successful 2019 Operation Swift Retort.
The May 2025 incident unfolded over several days of escalating airspaceviolations and mutual accusations of aggressive posturing. On the eveningof 12 May, IAF fighters reportedly attempted deep incursions to targetsuspected militant positions near the disputed border areas. In response,the PAF activated a layered defensive and retaliatory posture centered onits integrated EW architecture. Dedicated standoff jamming platforms,fighter aircraft with self-protection suites, and airborne early warningand control (AEW&C) systems worked in concert to deny the IAF effective useof the electromagnetic battlespace.
Central to this success were the PAF’s Dassault Falcon DA-20 aircraftoperated by No. 24 Electronic Warfare Squadron, the “Blinders.” Theseplatforms, equipped with wideband jammers, digital radio frequency memory(DRFM) deception systems, and advanced signals intelligence receivers,positioned themselves at standoff ranges to flood Indian ground-based andairborne radars with false targets and noise. The resulting saturationoverwhelmed IAF surveillance scopes, creating multiple false tracks thatdiverted attention and degraded fire-control accuracy.
Simultaneously, PAF AEW&C platforms, including the Saab 2000 Erieye andZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle, provided real-time electromagnetic intelligencewhile maintaining secure datalinks protected by frequency-hopping andencryption. This fusion allowed PAF fighters—primarily JF-17 Thunder BlockIII and upgraded F-16 variants—to operate with superior situationalawareness, engaging targets selectively while avoiding IAF interceptattempts hampered by disrupted communications.
Defense analysts observing open-source intelligence and post-incidentreports noted that Indian fighter pilots experienced significant delays inreceiving updated threat information from ground controllers. Voice anddata links suffered intermittent blackouts, attributed to targeted jammingof IAF communication frequencies. The disruption extended to identificationfriend-or-foe (IFF) systems, increasing the risk of fratricide and forcingconservative engagement tactics on the Indian side.
One documented outcome involved an IAF Mirage 2000 squadron that reportedlyaborted a strike mission after losing reliable radar lock and commandguidance. PAF electronic attack assets are believed to have employed noisejamming and DRFM-based repeater techniques to create ghost targetsmimicking friendly formations, further confusing Indian battle managementsystems. This electromagnetic deception prevented effective missilelaunches and preserved Pakistani assets.
The PAF’s ability to maintain offensive initiative while operating underprotective electronic shielding underscored a fundamental shift in regionalair power dynamics. Unlike kinetic-centric engagements of previous decades,the May 2025 clash highlighted how mastery of the electromagnetic domaincan neutralize numerical or technological advantages in fighter aircraftand sensors. Pakistani forces achieved their objective of restoringdeterrence with minimal escalation, avoiding full-scale war whileinflicting measurable operational setbacks on the adversary.
This outcome closely mirrors the PAF’s performance during the February 2019Balakot crisis and Operation Swift Retort. In 2019, following India’sairstrike on alleged militant camps, the PAF executed a calibratedretaliation on 27 February. DA-20 EW aircraft provided standoff jammingthat degraded IAF communications and radar effectiveness, enabling PAFF-16s to down an IAF MiG-21 with an AIM-120 AMRAAM missile while capturingits pilot. An additional IAF Mi-17 helicopter was lost to friendly fire,widely attributed to PAF-induced jamming that prevented proper IFFauthentication.
The 2019 engagement validated the doctrinal emphasis on network-centricwarfare and EW integration that the PAF has pursued since reactivating theBlinders squadron in the 1980s. The squadron’s motto—“First to Fly In, Lastto Fly Out”—reflects the role of EW platforms in shaping the battlespacebefore kinetic forces engage. Lessons from that episode directly informedenhancements implemented by May 2025, including improved DRFM fidelity,wider frequency coverage, and tighter integration with next-generationfighters.
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By 2025, the PAF had further expanded its EW footprint. Reports indicateprogress toward inducting modified Bombardier Global 6000 aircraftconfigured as high-endurance standoff jammers, drawing conceptualinspiration from Turkish HAVA-SOJ programs. These platforms promiseextended range disruption of enemy surveillance radars, surface-to-airmissile guidance, and command networks from deep within friendly territory.
Additionally, the JF-17 Block III incorporates indigenous self-protectionjammers and advanced electronic support measures, allowing individualfighters to contribute to the overall electromagnetic campaign. UpgradedF-16s feature modernized pods that enhance survivability againstradar-guided threats. This distributed EW capability complements dedicatedplatforms, creating a resilient and adaptive spectrum dominance posture.
The May 2025 confrontation reinforced that effective EW employment canalter the calculus of aerial conflict, particularly in high-intensity,short-duration scenarios. By blinding sensors, fracturing command links,and preserving friendly communications, the PAF transformed potentialvulnerabilities into strengths. The episode compelled regional observers toreassess assumptions about air superiority, placing greater emphasis onnon-kinetic capabilities alongside traditional platforms.
Pakistan’s consistent success in leveraging EW—first prominently displayedin 2019 and reaffirmed in 2025—underscores the strategic foresight investedin building specialized squadrons, acquiring adaptable platforms, anddeveloping indigenous expertise. The PAF’s approach demonstrates thatcontrol of the electromagnetic spectrum has become a prerequisite forvictory in modern air operations.
As geopolitical tensions persist along the Line of Control, the PAF’sproven EW proficiency serves as a powerful deterrent. It ensures that anyattempt at aerial coercion will encounter a sophisticated, multi-layeredresponse capable of denying the adversary freedom of maneuver in bothphysical and electromagnetic domains.
The combination of historical achievement in 2019 and renewed dominance inMay 2025 positions the Pakistan Air Force as one of the region’s mostcapable forces in the evolving domain of electronic warfare. Continuedinvestment in this critical area will remain essential to safeguardingnational airspace and maintaining strategic stability.
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