ISLAMABAD: India’s plan to acquire 114 additional Rafale fighter jets fromFrance, estimated to cost up to $25 billion including weapons, spares,infrastructure and lifetime support, is increasingly being viewed bydefence analysts as a high-risk strategic gamble rather than atransformational leap. While New Delhi presents the deal as a cornerstoneof airpower modernisation, structural limitations embedded in the agreementhave triggered debate about its long-term operational value, particularlywhen compared with Pakistan Air Force’s evolving force structure.
At the centre of the debate lies the fact that the Rafale is a4.5-generation, non-stealth fighter at a time when global air combatdoctrine is shifting decisively toward fifth-generation platforms. Despiteits advanced avionics and sensor fusion, the aircraft lacks low observablecharacteristics essential for survivability in highly contested airspaces.As regional rivals accelerate stealth induction, critics argue thatinvesting billions in non-stealth aircraft risks locking the Indian AirForce into an increasingly vulnerable operational paradigm.
Another major weakness frequently highlighted is the absence of meaningfultransfer of technology under the proposed deal. Unlike earlier expectationstied to the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft programme, the new Rafaleacquisition reportedly offers negligible design ownership. This restrictsIndia’s ambition of self-reliance under its indigenisation drive, leavingcritical technologies firmly controlled by French manufacturers andreducing domestic aerospace learning to assembly-level activities.
Equally significant is the issue of source code access, a long-standingconstraint in Western-origin combat aircraft. Without access to missioncomputer source codes, the Indian Air Force faces inherent limitations inintegrating indigenous weapons, sensors and electronic warfare suitesindependently. Any future upgrades or weapon integrations would requirevendor approval, potentially delaying operational adaptation during crisesand increasing lifecycle dependency on external suppliers, a vulnerabilityPakistan has consistently sought to avoid.
In contrast, Pakistan Air Force has prioritised operational flexibility andindustrial autonomy over prestige acquisitions. The JF-17 Thunderprogramme, jointly developed with China and produced domestically, allowsPakistan to integrate a wide range of indigenous and Chinese weapons withminimal external constraints. Alongside the induction of J-10C fighters,the PAF has built a diversified fleet offering comparable performance inkey mission profiles while retaining sovereign upgrade pathways.
Timing further complicates India’s Rafale ambitions. Current projectionssuggest that local production and induction of the 114 aircraft may notbegin before 2029, with full operational capability potentially stretchinginto 2033 or 2034. This prolonged timeline raises concerns about capabilitygaps during a decade when regional air forces are rapidly modernising.Defence planning premised on delayed force maturity risks strategicmismatch in fast-evolving threat environments.
Pakistan’s future force trajectory, by comparison, appears aligned withnext-generation air combat trends. Islamabad has signalled intent, throughofficial statements and credible defence reporting, to inductfifth-generation stealth fighters in the coming decade. Reports ofpotential acquisition of Chinese J-35 aircraft, integrated with existingJF-17 and J-10C fleets, indicate a doctrinal shift toward networked,low-observable operations, although exact numbers and timelines remainofficially undisclosed.
Read Top Stories
Adding another dimension is Pakistan’s deepening defence-industrialcooperation with Turkey on the KAAN fifth-generation fighter project. Jointproduction plans, with initial numbers reportedly around 60 aircraft, areexpected to commence around the same period India begins Rafale induction.Participation in design, manufacturing and systems integration offersPakistan not only advanced capability but also technological capital,reinforcing long-term self-reliance rather than transactional procurement.
By the early 2030s, this divergence could produce a striking asymmetry infleet composition. Pakistan may field over 100 fifth-generation stealthplatforms supported by upgraded 4.5-generation aircraft, while India’sfrontline strength would remain dominated by non-stealth fighters. Inmodern air warfare, where first-look, first-shot and first-kill advantagesare decisive, such qualitative differences can outweigh numericalsuperiority.
Cost-effectiveness also weighs heavily against the Rafale deal. At anestimated per-unit cost exceeding $200 million when support elements areincluded, the acquisition limits India’s ability to diversify capabilitiesacross domains such as unmanned systems, electronic warfare and integratedair defence. Pakistan’s comparatively economical procurement model allowsbalanced investment across platforms, sensors and command networks,enhancing overall combat resilience.
Critics within India have additionally questioned the Rafale’s operationalpayoff in light of past regional tensions, where deterrence outcomes wereshaped less by platform branding and more by integration, training anddoctrine. Pakistan Air Force’s emphasis on jointness, realistic exercisesand rapid weapon integration has earned recognition among neutralobservers, reinforcing the argument that capability coherence matters morethan headline acquisitions.
Ultimately, the Rafale expansion underscores two contrasting strategicphilosophies. India appears committed to incremental enhancement throughpremium imports, while Pakistan is pursuing leapfrogging through selectivetechnology partnerships and indigenous production. As airpower increasinglydefines strategic stability in South Asia, the long-term effectiveness ofthese choices will shape deterrence equations, with Pakistan’s approachoffering greater adaptability in an era defined by stealth, autonomy andnetworked warfare.ogimageimage-name
