ISLAMABAD: The most significant geopolitical realignment in the Middle Eastduring the past half decade has been the widening strategic rift betweenSaudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, two countries that were longregarded as a united front against Iranian influence and a pillar of Gulfstability. What began as subtle policy divergences has evolved into opencompetition, visible in Yemen’s battlefields, OPEC deliberations, maritimeboundary disputes and the aggressive pursuit of foreign investment. Between2019 and 2025 the once-celebrated partnership has steadily eroded, givingway to a cold and increasingly confrontational relationship that analystsdescribe as the Gulf’s new defining rivalry.
The personal dimension of this estrangement is central to understanding itsdepth. For several years after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s rapidrise in 2015, UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan acted as akey mentor and international advocate. Emirati officials invested heavilyin polishing the Saudi leader’s image in Western capitals, portraying himas a bold reformer. Joint military campaigns in Yemen and the 2017 Qatarblockade demonstrated near-perfect alignment. That cohesion, however, beganto crack once Prince Mohammed bin Salman consolidated domestic power andsought greater autonomy from Abu Dhabi’s orbit.
The first public fracture appeared in January 2021 with the Al-Ulaagreement that ended the Qatar blockade. Riyadh negotiated and signed thedeal largely without prior consultation with Abu Dhabi, a move widelyinterpreted in Gulf capitals as a deliberate signal that Saudi Arabia wouldno longer defer to Emirati preferences on major regional files. Thedecision sowed early seeds of mistrust that later blossomed into outrightanimosity.
Tensions escalated dramatically in late 2022 when Prince Mohammed binSalman reportedly told a private gathering of journalists that the UAE had“stabbed Saudi Arabia in the back”. The remark, first disclosed by The WallStreet Journal, marked a rare moment of raw public candour from thenormally guarded Saudi leader. Since then high-level bilateral meetingshave become extremely rare, with both leaders frequently skipping summitshosted by the other country. The personal chill has translated intoinstitutional estrangement across multiple policy arenas.
Yemen remains the clearest theatre of rivalry. Saudi Arabia hasconsistently pursued the restoration of a unified government underPresident Rashad al-Alimi as the best guarantee of border security. TheUAE, by contrast, has cultivated the Southern Transitional Council,providing it with financial, military and political support. In December2025 Saudi air strikes targeted the port of Mukalla, with Riyadh statingthat weapons shipments destined for STC fighters had originated from UAEports. The Saudi Foreign Ministry described continued Emirati backing forsouthern separatists as crossing a “red line” for national security.
Maritime boundaries have emerged as another flashpoint. The Al-Yasat marinearea, located near the Saudi-Emirati border, has become the subject ofintense diplomatic contestation. In 2024 the UAE unilaterally designatedparts of the zone as a protected marine area, prompting a formal Saudiprotest at the United Nations. Riyadh argues that the declaration infringeson the 1974 border agreement and encroaches on Saudi waters that may holdsignificant hydrocarbon reserves. The dispute underscores how competitionhas moved beyond proxy conflicts into direct claims over sovereign space.
Economic rivalry now overshadows purely political differences. In 2021Saudi Arabia introduced regulations requiring multinational corporations toestablish regional headquarters in the Kingdom if they wished to retaingovernment contracts. The policy delivered tangible results: by the end of2025 more than six hundred international companies had relocated theirMiddle East headquarters from Dubai to Riyadh. The shift represents adirect challenge to Dubai’s decades-long status as the Gulf’s undisputedcommercial hub.
Visionary mega-projects further intensify the contest. The Red Sea Globaltourism development and the futuristic city of NEOM, with a combinedestimated investment exceeding eight hundred billion dollars, are designedto position Saudi Arabia as a major global leisure and businessdestination. Industry data indicate that these initiatives have alreadybegun diverting high-end tourist flows and event bookings away fromestablished Emirati resorts. The competition extends to aviation, withRiyadh aggressively expanding King Khalid International Airport andattracting new long-haul carriers.
Energy policy has become another arena of friction. Throughout 2024 and2025 satellite monitoring and trade statistics suggested that the UAEoccasionally exceeded its OPEC production quotas, a practice that SaudiArabia views as undermining the group’s price-stabilisation efforts. Riyadhhas repeatedly advocated for deeper cuts to support higher oil prices,while Abu Dhabi has pushed for higher output quotas to maximise revenuefrom its expanding capacity. Emirati officials have hinted at thepossibility of leaving the OPEC framework altogether, a scenario that wouldseverely weaken Saudi influence over global oil pricing.
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Proxy struggles have also spread beyond Yemen. In Sudan’s ongoing civil warthe UAE has supplied advanced drones and other materiel to the RapidSupport Forces led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, reportedly aiming tosecure strategic access to Red Sea ports. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, hasprovided political and logistical backing to the Sudanese Armed Forces,concerned that an Emirati-aligned militia presence would threaten its ownmaritime security interests in the same waterway.
Ideological divergence adds another layer. The UAE has pursued anaggressive campaign against political Islam, supporting anti-Islamistfactions in Libya, Tunisia and elsewhere. Saudi Arabia, under PrinceMohammed bin Salman, has adopted a more pragmatic approach, graduallyreducing domestic restrictions on religious expression and engagingcautiously with a broader spectrum of political actors. The contrastingphilosophies have widened the strategic disconnect.
The current trajectory suggests that meaningful reconciliation in the nearterm is unlikely. Both states pursue overlapping ambitions—globalinvestment, tourism dominance, military modernisation and influence overcritical sea lanes—while possessing the financial resources andinternational connections to sustain prolonged competition. For Washingtonand other global powers, the fracturing of what was once the GulfCooperation Council’s most reliable axis presents a new and complexchallenge to regional balance.
The Saudi-Emirati relationship has thus moved from partnership to peerrivalry. The consequences are already reshaping the political, economic andsecurity landscape of the Middle East, with ripple effects likely topersist for years to come.
Source:https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-crown-prince-accuses-uae-of-betrayal-11671234567Tags:Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Salman, YemenConflict, OPEC Plus
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