WASHINGTON: Since Donald Trump’s new year tweet threatening Pakistan of aidcut and blaming Islamabad of harbouring terrorists the bilateral tiesbetween Pakistan and US have witnessed a new low.
However After firebrand speeches from both sides the environment seems tobe cooling down courtesy to the backdoor contacts between the establishmentof the two states. However the experts have revealed to the Trump thatPakistan would not be budging to the US pressure.
Pakistan cannot be bludgeoned into taking steps it believes dangerous toits security, even if it means losing the US aid, argues a new book onPakistan-US relations.
The book — The Leverage Paradox: Pakistan and the United States — by RobertHathaway, a prominent US scholar of South Asian affairs, traces the historyof bilateral relations from the early 1950s to the Trump era, concludingthat both nations benefited from this relationship.
“There is little in the historical record to support the contention thatPakistan can be bludgeoned into taking steps it believes dangerous to itssecurity. To the contrary, repeated US attempts to condition its aid toPakistani behaviour failed to induce the better behaviour Washington hadhoped for,” Mr Hathaway writes.
He demonstrates how efforts to coerce Pakistan merely reinforcedIslamabad’s belief that its “putative friend sought only to advance a USagenda at odds with Pakistan’s security”.
The book argues that Pakistan has always viewed the benefits that flow fromAmerican favour as “prizes worth working to acquire, but not at any price”.
Book traces history of Islamabad-Washington ties from early 1950s to Trumpera
Washington’s inability to recognise this reality, “repeatedly led USdecision-makers to overestimate the leverage their power gave them,” theauthor warns.
Rejecting the argument that Pakistan has been a passive victim or target ofAmerican initiatives, Mr Hathaway argues that Islamabad has been “a fullpartner in a diplomatic two-step” that has reflected Pakistan’s as well asAmerican policy goals. “Generally, Pakistan played its hand well to bluntthe force of American power,” he adds.
The book shows how in dealing with the Americans over the decades, Pakistanhas held three hugely valuable assets: it occupied strategic geography,possessed considerable strength in its own right and was able to capitaliseon the needs of the stronger to further its own ends.
Trump and Pakistan
While reviewing US-Pakistan relations under the Trump administration, thebook shows US President Donald Trump’s faith in the utility of Americanstrategy that has impacted US-Pakistan ties.
The book includes several quotes from Mr Trump’s statements on Pakistan —from 2012 to 2017 — and leads the readers to his Aug 21 speech in which heunveiled a new American strategy for Afghanistan.
“We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars at the sametime they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting. But thatwill have to change, and that will change immediately,” Mr Trump declaredin that speech.
The author says that this speech was unsettling for Pakistanis who feltthat the US intended to change its approach toward Pakistan.
The author says that while the statement was specific to Afghanistan,Pakistanis feared that the president’s words could apply to their owncountry as well.
Mr Hathaway notes that soon after the unveiling of the new Afghan policy,US Vice President Mike Pence wrote a piece in USA Today, declaring that theUS has put Pakistan “on notice”.
The author shows how Pakistanis found two other aspects of the new Trumppolicy especially alarming. One was the absence of any serious discussionof a negotiated end to the war in Afghanistan. “Other than a tokenreference to a political settlement, Mr Trump was virtually silent on whatappeared to Pakistanis the only way for Afghanistan to move beyondperpetual turmoil,” he notes.
“Even worse from Pakistan’s perspective, Mr Trump spoke of furtherdeveloping the US-India ‘strategic partnership’,” he adds, noting that onecomponent of this was for India to assume a larger role in Afghanistan,especially in the areas of economic assistance and development.
Mr Hathaway points out that “keeping Indian influence in Afghanistan to abare minimum had been one of the touchstones of Pakistani strategy sincesigning up with the Americans in the days after 9/11” and Mr Trump’s newpolicy, it appeared, “could not have struck Pakistan’s vital interests moredirectly”.
He notes how Islamabad lost no time in pushing back, reminding Americansthat they “should not make Pakistan a scapegoat for their failure inAfghanistan”.
Commenting on the limitations of the US pressure on Pakistan, the book usesa quote from a Pakistani commentator, Nadia Naviwala, who argues that “afew hundred million dollars is not much of a stick,” especially whencompared with Pakistan-China relationship, which is now worth about $110billion.
Mr Hathaway also advises the Trump administration not to overestimate thevalue of its favour or the attraction of its carrots.
The author argues that a country attempting leverage must minimise itsdependence upon the target country, mark its priorities and also keepitself abreast of internal developments in the target country.
He also advises the Trump administration to: “Negotiate from a position ofstrength, and don’t take military force off the table. Do not be afraid towalk away from negotiations; the other party probably needs a bargain morethan you do”.