LONDON – The Indian Army’s so-called Cold Start doctrine (CSD), also knownas Pro-Active doctrine, a doctrine geared toward swift offensive operationsinto enemy territory, will be war-gamed in February, followed by fieldexercises in May, accordinglinktoIndian media reports. News of the war games and military exercises earlierthis month were followed by the testlinkofthe nuclear-capable Nasr close-range ballistic missile by the PakistaniArmy Strategic Forces Command in late January. The development anddeployment of the Nasr is seen by many analysts as a direct response toIndia’s plans to implement Cold Start in the event of conflict withPakistan.
For a long time, India officially denied the existence of CSD. However, inJanuary 2017, Chief of Army Staff General Bipin Rawat for the first timepublicly acknowledged the doctrine in an interview: “The Cold Startdoctrine exists for conventional military operations. Whether we have toconduct conventional operations for such strikes is a decision well thoughtthrough, involving the government and the Cabinet Committee on Security.”
The remarks came as a surprise to many given that the Indian Army hadapparently scrapped its limited war concept following then Chief of ArmyStaff General V.K. Singh’s public announcementlinkthatCSD did not exist, although he did acknowledge that the Indian Armypossessed a “pro-active strategy” for war with Pakistan. Islamabad inresponse began building low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. Additionally,to bolster its deterrence posture, Pakistan continues to refuse to adopt ano-first use nuclear doctrine.*Enjoying this article?* Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 amonth. link
Cold Start was reportedly devised following the Indian Army failure tomobilize quickly in response to the December 2001 attack on the IndianParliament. India’s mobilization along the so-called Line of Control (LOC)in Kashmir, codenamed Operation Parakram, occurred at a slow pace and ittook three weeks for the Indian military to move 500,000 troops and threearmored divisions and support units (the so-called strike corps) to theborder. (The Indian military also sustained around 400 casualties duringmine-laying operations.)
The delay allowed the Pakistan Army to mobilize and move 300,000 troopsincluding its own two strike corps, the Army Reserve North and Army ReserveSouth, to the contested border. Lacking strategic surprise, the Indianmilitary withdrew after a 10-month standoff. In after action reviews, themilitary concluded that the size of the strike corps made them difficult tomaneuver and that the lack of offensive capability of the so-called holdingcorps was a serious handicap for quick military actions against Pakistan.
As a result, CSD was developed by the Indian Army in 2004 to facilitatesmaller scale, rapid, and decisive conventional offensive operations intoPakistani territory in the event of Pakistani-sponsored asymmetrical attackon Indian soil before the international community can actively intervene,and before Pakistan would feel compelled to launch nuclear retaliatorystrikes to repel an Indian invasion. It is still unclear what CSDspecifically entails, and senior Indian officers have on purpose remainedambiguous about it.
It appears that offensive operations in the spirit of CSD were carried inSeptember 2016 when India conducted “surgical strikes”linkterrorist camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The operation involved aheliborne unit and Indian Special Operations Forces, which, givenPakistan’s strong air defenses in the region, made some analysts skepticalabout the precise nature of the operation. (Notably the Indian governmentdecided not to implement CSD-type operations following the 2008 Mumbaiattacks).
Yet in its purported classical (and most ambitious) conception, India’slimited war strategy under CSD calls for armored thrusts into Pakistaniterritory supported by mechanized infantry formations and air power within48-72 hours at the outset of a military confrontation with Islamabad. TheseBlitzkrieg-style operations would heavily depend on close coordinationbetween the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force given the pivotal roleclose air support and overwhelming conventional firepower would play insuch a campaign.
Consequently, to make this invasion force nimbler and easier to coordinate,a complete reorganization of the Indian Army was envisioned. First, thearmy would strengthen its holding and pivot corps stationed along the LOCwith new offensive capabilities: division-sized integrated battle groups(IBG) consisting of artillery, armor, and aviation elements each capable oflimited offensive operations. These IBGs are central to the Indian Army’soffensive military doctrine and also featured in the Indian Army’s recentlyreleased Land Warfare Doctrinelink.
Second, the Indian Army would disaggregate three of its strike corps intodivision-sized IBGs and move them closer to the India-Pakistan border. Oneof the strike corps is also slated be restructured into a rapid reaction“saber corps,” according to media reports, reportedly capable ofimmediately conducting offensive operations into Pakistan in the event of aconflict.
All of the IBGs, equipped with artillery, armored personnel carriers, mainbattle tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles, would be capable of launchinglimited strikes (50-80 kilometers deep) along different axes of advanceinto enemy territory supported by air power. The Indian Army is purportedlynow also planning to turn each of the three brigades of a division-sizedIBG into an autonomous unit capable of independent military operations,although details remain murky and have not been confirmed by the IndianMinistry of Defense.
Accordinglinktoan October 2018 media report, a detailed IBG concept is expected to befinalized in six to eight months. General Bipin Rawat envisions that everyIBG will consist of four to six infantry and armored battalions and two tothree artillery regiments, next to air defense, logistical, signal, andheadquarter units — overall 8,000 to 10,000 troops. Consequently, the sizeof the IBGs would fall in between an Army division and brigade in terms ofmanpower (a division on average has a strength of around 20,000 troops).
Rawat envisions that eight to ten such IBGs could be stood up againstPakistan while an equal number, albeit smaller sized due to the mountainousterrain, could be deployed against China.
However, according to multiple public sources, these structural andorganizational changes, part of a four-point reorganization of the IndianArmy by the chief of staff, have so far not been implemented. Indeed, thereis no evidence that any IBGs have been stood up to date.
“We are going to test-bed the IBGs very soon. I am suggesting that we beintegrated in peacetime to save the time wasted in ‘integrating’ whilegoing for combat,” Rawat saidlinkina November 2018 interview. “Various battalions [of infantry, armored,artillery, signals, and engineers] are already assigned to an area and wenow want them to be ready in peacetime.”
Notably, there is very little public evidence that the Indian Army iscapable of executing CSD in the event of a new military confrontationbetween India and Pakistan at the moment or in the near future. Next to theambivalent results of a number of Indian war games practicing variousaspects of CSD in the last years, a cursory look at Indian militaryhardware reveals major deficiencies and capability gaps that would hinderthe current execution of large-scale offensive operations against Pakistan.
For example, the Indian Army still lacks a sufficient number ofoperational modernmain battle tanks (MBT)link,in particular T-90SMs, the most advanced version of the T-90. Also, themajority of indigenously developed third generation Arjun MK-I main battletanks are currently grounded due to various technical problems and missingspare parts. An upgraded version of the Arjun is currently underdevelopment but it is unclear when it will become operational.
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Furthermore, the Indian Army lacks self-propelled tracked howitzers forclose artillery support. Only in May 2017 did the Indian Ministry ofDefense decide to go ahead with the purchase of the first batch of 100modified K-9 Vajra 155 mm/52 caliber guns. Overall, the Indian Army willneed at least 250 self-propelled guns for its strike corps. (The IndianArmy took deliverylinkofthe first batch of ten K-9 Vajra 155 mm/52 caliber self-propelledtracked howitzers in late 2018.)
In addition, the army lacks advanced mobile air defense systems to coverthe advance of armored forces. For example India will only begin receivinglinkitsfirst out of five regimental sets of Russian-made Almaz-Antei S-400*Triumf* airdefense systems (NATO reporting name: SA-21 Growler) in October 2020.
Even more critically, the Indian military has been suffering from a chronicammunition shortage for the past two decades. Current ammunition levelswould only last for about 10 days of high intensity war. The IndianMinistry of Defense has taken steps to address this problem, by, forexample, purchasing 66,000 anti-tank shells from Russia in 2014, but newammunition is only slowly trickling in to replenish depleted stocks. TheIndian Army continues to lack 68,000 anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) ofvarious types and around 850 launchers.
“The Indian Army is looking for stopgap measures to quickly address thiscapability gap by inducting new ATGM systems as quickly as possible,” Iwrotelinkelsewhere.“The service is reportedly pushing for a fast-track procurement of 2,500third-generation shoulder-fired ATGMs and 96 launchers through agovernment-government contract.” The ATGM capability gap, however, isexpected to persist at least until 2022.
Additionally, the Indian Air Force currently lacks the close-air supportcapability necessary for swift armored thrusts into Pakistani territory.Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL) Light Combat Helicopter only completedlinkweaponstrials this month. The interservice rivalry, partially influenced by thefact that CSD has been developed by the Indian Army, has also madeintegration and synchronization of air-ground operations challenging (airassets of the Indian Navy only play a minor role in CSD).
For example, the Indian Air Force insists that its principal missionremains air-to-air combat and strategic bombing, which has causedconsternation between the former and the Indian Army Air Corps. “For anumber of years, the Indian Army has been engaged in a tug of war with theIndian Air Force over who should operate [a] future fleet of Apachegunships,” I explainedlink.“The Army initially asked for the gunships to be inducted into its ranks,or for the Air Force to at least share the helicopters with the groundforces.”
Joint-service warfare as required by CSD also mandates a network-centricwarfare capability, that is the ability coordinate geographically dispersedforces, including unnamed aerial vehicles and satellites, with advancedcommunications technology in a timely manner. However, the Indian militaryis only slowly building up a robust capability in this field. Indianreconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisitioncapabilities would also currently not be able to support a full-scale andswift implementation of CSD.
Next to the low operational readiness rate of most Indian military hardwareand the lack of modern equipment, the perhaps most glaring deficiency isthe lack of thousands of trained military officers. The Indian Army aloneis short of 7,300 officers, accordinglinktothe Indian government.
Looking at all of these deficiency and gaps, it is perhaps then not unfairto conclude that CSD is still in an experimental phase and remains a“mixture of myth and reality,” as a leaked 2010 assessmentlink bythe U.S. Embassy in New Delhi put it. Yet India’s opponent apparentlycannot take comfort in that assessment.
Pakistan has taken the threat of CSD seriously, building up its tacticalnuclear weapons arsenal on the one hand and shoring up its conventionalmilitary response on the other. In response to CSD, the Pakistan militaryhas also adopted a so-called New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF)linkinorder to improve interservice coordination and reduce the mobilization timefor the Pakistan Army. Some Indian analysts worry that Pakistan at thisstage can mobilize faster than India as a result of NCWF.
This assessment is in line with a recent analysislinkthatargues that Pakistan’s conventional military deterrence is more robust thancommonly assumed.
Should Pakistan indeed be capable of mobilizing its conventional militaryforces faster than India, the principal purpose behind Cold Start —deploying overwhelming conventional forces across the Pakistani borderbefore the Pakistani military could exploit its defensive and geographicaladvantage — would be void. It would call into question the whole rationalebehind the Indian military leadership’s embrace of a doctrine that not onlyapparently fuels the buildup of Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear forces,but also ups the chances of political and military miscalculations on bothsides in the event of a major crisis.
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*BY: Franz Stephen Gady: This article is based on an analysis previouslypublished in *The Diplomat Magazine*. *
