NEW DELHI: India has no clarity about its military and strategic objectivesvis-à-vis its stated adversaries, Pakistan and China, and can defeatneither of them in a war, a new book by N.C. Asthana, former Indian policeofficer respected for his insights into security affairs, says.
*The Wire* on Tuesday carried a review of the book National Security andConventional Arms Race: Spectre of a Nuclear War. It quotes the book asseeing “a huge mismatch between the militaristic official and mediarhetoric, on the one hand, and the reality, which is that India cannotdefeat either country militarily.”
The reviewer, Siddharth Varadarajan, editor of the esteemed current affairsportal, quotes Asthana as suggesting that instead of pouring vast sums ofmoney into expensive weapons imports, India would be better served byfinding solutions to the security challenges both Pakistan and Chinapresent by strengthening itself internally and pursuing non-militarysolutions, including diplomacy.
Asthana’s columns are widely read for their scholarship and he has authored48 books, written or co-authored while in service. He is particularly knownfor his willingness to be sharply critical of the political andbureaucratic establishment, Varadarajan says.
Author says that exploiting enmity with Pakistan for electoral benefits hasmade Indian leaders victims of their own rhetoric.
Asthana also puts the lens on what he calls the “politics of warmongering”,which, according to him, has consumed public discourse in India over thepast six years.
“Under the delusion that India has somehow, magically become invincible, henotes how a large number of Indians seem to be itching for a war.”
This invincibility narrative is both fuelled and strengthened by relentlessarms imports. Asthana puts the figure India has spent on arms imports inthe five years since 2014 at $14 billion, “and the undisclosed cost of the36 Rafale jets purchased from Dassault Aviation is not included in this.”
But even this sum pales before the $130bn India is projected to spend onarms imports in the next decade, including on 100-plus even more expensivefighter jets to make up for the shortfall caused by the Modi government’sdecision to scrap the earlier deal for 126 Rafales.
“As the fanfare over the arrival of the first Rafales showed, each of thesepurchases is hailed and sold to the public by the media as weapons thatwill flatten India’s enemies. But of course, this is far from the truth,”Varadarajan quotes the book as saying.
Asthana argues that the frenzied import of conventional weapons will neverguarantee a permanent solution to the military problem posed by Pakistan orChina because both the countries are nuclear-weapon states and cannot bedecisively defeated on the battlefield.
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“Given the myth of Indian invincibility, the futility of warmongeringshould be obvious. Yet, as the past few years have demonstrated, jingoismin India is at an all-time high,” the book notes.
“While conventional weapons can provide a tactical advantage in limitedtheatre conflicts short of war, the danger lies in escalation — which ishard to control at the best of times but especially so when the publicdiscourse has been vitiated by the politics of warmongering.”
Asthana believes that exploiting enmity with Pakistan for electoralbenefits has made Indian leaders victims of their own rhetoric, where theyare left with a one-dimensional policy — one which is unrealistic in viewof Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Quoting Napoleon, he notes: “If they wantpeace, nations should avoid the pinpricks that precede cannon shots.”
India’s army, air force and navy are bigger than those of Pakistan.However, according to Asthana, the limited number of axes of attack, inwhich the much-touted Cold Start could be employed, tends to make the wholething quite predictable.
There is no scope for any element of shock and surprise. Moreover,practically all options and counters to them have been debated and exploredby both sides.
“In any case, the moment Pakistan feels that it is going to lose aconventional war under the weight of a bigger Indian military, it will feelcompelled to go nuclear immediately. This is not 1971. Recall what GeneralKhalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s strategic command, told a visitingItalian arms control organisation delegation about the country’s red linesin 2002.”
*The Wire *review recalls General Kidwai as saying that Pakistani nuclearweapons will be used “if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is atstake”. Asthana summarises Gen Kidwai’s red lines thus: “Nuclear weaponsare aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they will be usedif India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (spacethreshold), India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces(military threshold), India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan(economic strangling), India pushes Pakistan into political destabilisationor creates a large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domesticdestabilisation).”
According to General Kidwai, “examples of economic strangling of Pakistanincluded a naval blockade and the stopping of the waters of the Indusriver”.
