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Pakistan s weak Nuclear diplomacy vis a vis India

Pakistan s weak Nuclear diplomacy vis a vis India

*ISLAMABAD: *Weak diplomacy by Islamabad cost the country exclusive,beneficial terms with Washington and is currently failing the country insecuring it a place on the table with 48-member nuclear supplier group.

This was stated by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) lawmaker Dr ShireenMazari while addressing a workshop on “Chagai: 20 Years Later” to mark the20th anniversary of the 1998 nuclear tests in the remote mountains ofChagai in Balochistan. The workshop had been organised by Strategic StudiesInstitute Islamabad (SSII).

Mazari, who is also the director general of the SSII, said that Pakistanhas strong credentials on nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation.

Moreover, she said that Islamabad meets the requirements for fullintegration into the global multilateral export control regimes havingadopted various measures regarding physical protection of nuclear materialsand also developed strong mechanisms for regulating nuclear safety andradiation protection aspects —overseen by the Pakistan Nuclear RegulatoryAuthority (PNRA).

Dr Mazari suggested that Pakistan should engage with countries who hadobjected to India’s inclusion to the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG). This,she suggested, Pakistan should accomplish by using its own diplomatic meansto effectively deal with the issue rather than relying on intermediaries.

“Pakistan needs proactive and timely diplomacy to counter this issue,” shesaid.

The problem, she highlighted, has been that our nuclear diplomacy has beenweak.

India, on the other hand, has moved smartly and swiftly securing membershipof supplier cartels one by one.

“Pakistan would be at a permanent disadvantage if India gets the NSGmembership. Our diplomacy should be active on this issue,” Mazari said.

She lamented that Islamabad never pursued diplomacy and rather relied onChina. Pakistan, she said, only introduced a first-strike doctrine afterIndia had devised its cold-start doctrine.

Moreover, it also addresses sub-nuclear threats and not only for nuclearthreats. It means being able to address the threats at all levels.

She highlighted technological advancements over the past two decades,especially the acquisition of the first/second strike options insea-launched missiles and cruise missiles.

“Our record on the nuclear issue is in line with global norms ofnon-proliferation. Therefore India should not be treated differently,” sheargued.

In this regard, she said that any Pakistani diplomatic effort should aim tohighlight both India’s proliferation record and also our own efforts interms of strengthening our command and control and nuclear safety.

Moreover, there should be a criteria-based selection in NSG for non-NuclearProliferation Treaty (NPT) states and not country-specific.

Where it all started

Explaining the need for conducting the tests in the first place, Mazarisaid that if the bombs had not been exploded, India would have beenrecognised as a formal nuclear state and Islamabad would have been forcedto give up its programme.

“It would have been impossible for Pakistan to conduct tests later,” shesaid.

Mazari lamented that a lack of proper policy guidance in the aftermath ofthe 9/11 attacks, the US had successfully delinked India’s programme fromPakistan’s programme, allowing it to grant New Delhi civil nuclearconcessions under the 2005 US-India Nuclear Deal.

Pakistan, on the other hand, opted to sign International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) safeguards — something that India avoided until it had signeda country-specific agreement with the US with exit clauses.

“Pakistan failed to carry out active diplomacy and it resulted in a freepass to India and allowed it to sign agreements which are softer,” she said.