ISLAMABAD – Pakistan’s interest lies in avoiding a war in the Gulf,avoiding hostility with Iran, ensuring Tehran does not develop a nuclearweapon, and ensuring stability and security of Pakistan’s Gulf allies. Wewant to remain in the good books of our Western allies, especially theUnited States, and jointly work for international security.
But international pressure on Iran is also a good time to try to effectchange in Tehran’s policies on Pakistan and possibly in the wider region.For Islamabad, of special interest is Tehran’s open alliance with India’splans to contain and encircle Pakistan and fail the CPEC/Gwadar project.
So, the American pressure campaign on Iran helps Pakistan in some ways topursue its interests.
Pakistan is directly affected by the situation in the Gulf. Any war orlimited hostilities can impact Pakistani energy and economic interests, andties with major allies. In cases of past wars in the region, proxy groupsinside Pakistan linked to Iran and other countries were used for powerprojection through protests and attacks on diplomatic missions. There isalso a concern that the United States and Iran might enter a limitedconflict and then reconcile, leaving regional states pay the political andeconomic price of conflict without addressing the core problem, which meansrecurring future Iran-linked crises.
So it is wise on the part of Islamabad to call for “restraint” betweenTehran and Washington and encourage a peaceful resolution via concessionsby both sides. Iran is a neighbor that has a history of unpredictable rashactions and Pakistani officials are right in wanting to avoid being in theline of fire.
But while avoiding war, it would be wise to have a plan to protect corePakistani interests in the Gulf, keep Iran policy flexible and adjust itaccording to developments, and – most importantly – identify and exploitstrategic opportunity in conflict.
Pakistan can avoid hostility with an unpredictable and fiery Iran. At thesame time, Pakistan should politically align itself with, and expresspolitical support for, allies in the Gulf, especially United Arab Emirates,Saudi Arabia, and other GCC states. Islamabad should assist ininternational efforts to secure uninterrupted navigation through Strait ofHormuz. Pakistani economic and energy security is inseparable from Gulfstability, a region that hosts the largest Pakistani diaspora that pumpsthe single largest annual hard-currency infusion into Pakistani economy.Islamabad can politically support legitimate measures by Gulf allies todefend their security while maintaining good relations with Iran andcoddling it to give concessions for peace.
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But beyond bilateral diplomacy, this is a good time for Pakistanipolicymakers to develop long-term strategies on Iran, Gulf, the region, andrelations with the United States. Everybody is doing it, including Iran’sclosest allies Russia, China and India. These three countries have not lettheir political sympathies for Iran outweigh their global economicinterests. Russia is reportedly using Iran sanctions to extract concessionsfrom Tehran in Syria, on militias and Israel. China has implementedAmerican sanctions on Iran and might be interested in more Iraniancooperation on Gwadar and limiting joint sabotage operations with Indiaagainst CPEC. Pakistan has done something similar by informing Tehran whyit can’t proceed with the gas-pipeline project. The onus to provide aconducive international political environment for this project rests withIran, as Pakistan cannot be expected to pay the price for regionalconflicts started by or involving Iran that create obstacles for economicdiplomacy. Pakistan can and might go a step further and lobby Washington oncanceling sanctions waiver to India on Chabahar. Pakistani officials canargue that the joint India-Iran port project is good to counter CPEC [whichis the Indian argument] but that a bigger impact of Chabahar is to help endAmerican and Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and strengthen proxies inKabul who are opposed to Trump’s Afghan peace plan.
Tensions in the Gulf appear to have some links to the situation inBalochistan and Gwadar. The Fujairah incident on May 12 was preceded by adaring attack on Gwadar on May 11, and a drone attack on Saudi oilinstallations on May 14. A Norwegian oil insurance company’s report pointsthe finger at IRGC for Fujairah sabotage. A month before the Gwadar attack,militants from Iran executed 14 Pakistani soldiers traveling in a bus.Interestingly, in February, then IRGC chief Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafarithreatened Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Could this be linked to thesuccessive attacks on Gwadar, Fujairah and the Saudi pipeline?
There is a need to discuss Iran’s role in the region and assess if thisrole can change, helping avoid further crises and facilitating improvedPak-Iran cooperation. Pakistan can try help Iran temper its behavior, likeit did in 2006 when Iran’s then First Vice President Parviz Davoodi visitedIslamabad and heard President Musharraf’s blunt advice to immediately ceaseuranium enrichment and enter a dialogue with the US. [Musharraf reportedlytold Davoodi: “Tehran’s current policy was making life difficult for itsneighbor, Pakistan,” according a US embassy cable leaked by Wikileaks.]
And Iran can consider changing its behavior. During the same meeting in2006, Davoodi is believed to have let Pakistan quietly mediate talks withWashington. Islamabad can certainly assess if it can talk sense into theleaders in Tehran, encourage them to return to the days of presidentKhatami in the 1990s, who reached out to Arab countries and the West andnormalized relations. This, however, will require Tehran to end the policyof exporting the revolution. Can Pakistan convince Iran to do this? Fingerscrossed.
By: Ahmed Qureshi
