Pakistan’s Hangor-Class Submarines: Dangerous Coastal Threat to India Especially Mumbai

Pakistan’s Hangor-Class Submarines: Dangerous Coastal Threat to India Especially Mumbai

ISLAMABAD – Pakistan’s new Hangor-class submarines—Chinese-built S26variants derived from the Type-039A/B “Yuan”—represent the most significantupgrade to the Pakistan Navy’s underwater fleet since the Agosta class. Thefirst boat was launched at Wuchang Shipbuilding in April 2024, with moreunder construction in both China and at Karachi Shipyard under atransfer-of-technology program.Specifications (Open-Source Data)

*Total Planned*: 8 boats (4 from China, 4 built locally in Pakistan) –

*Length*: ~76 meters –

*Displacement*: ~2,800 tonnes submerged –

*Propulsion*: Diesel-electric with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) for extended underwater endurance –

*Armament*: 533 mm torpedo tubes, with the potential to launch both heavyweight torpedoes and cruise missiles

While exact weapon fits remain classified, analysts believe these boats maybe able to launch the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM),which has an estimated range of about 450 km.The Babur-3 Factor

The Babur-3, tested from an underwater platform in 2017 and 2018, providesa sea-based, survivable strike capability. If successfully integrated withthe Hangor-class, it would allow Pakistan to strike high-value coastaltargets without surfacing, reinforcing its declared second-strike nucleardeterrence posture.Range and Potential Coastal Coverage

If deployed in the northern Arabian Sea, a Hangor-class submarine withBabur-3 capability could hold at risk several major Indian coastal citiesand infrastructure hubs, particularly in Gujarat and Maharashtra. Thisincludes Mumbai and major industrial complexes along the Saurashtra andKutch coasts. Such attacks would be possible from standoff positionshundreds of kilometers offshore, reducing the submarine’s exposure todetection.Why Hangor-Class Is a Credible Threat

1.

*Stealth and Endurance* – AIP allows the submarine to remain submerged for much longer than conventional diesel-electric submarines, making detection harder. 2.

*Distributed Fleet* – Eight boats in service would force India to spread its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets thin across the Arabian Sea. 3.

*Standoff Weapons* – SLCMs allow the submarines to threaten targets without entering heavily defended coastal zones.

Limitations and Countermeasures

*Program Delays* – The original induction timeline (2022–2028) has slipped, and several technical details remain unconfirmed. –

*Indian ASW Capabilities* – India operates a layered ASW system using aircraft, surface ships, and its own submarines, making close coastal approaches risky. –

*Strategic Risks* – Any use of such submarines against major cities would be a significant escalation with severe consequences, meaning their primary role is likely deterrence rather than first-strike use.

Bottom Line

The Hangor-class, especially if paired with Babur-3 SLCMs, significantlyenhances Pakistan’s sea-based strike capability. While Indian coastalcities could be within reach in a conflict, strong counter-detectionmeasures and the risk of escalation mean the boats serve more as a potentdeterrent than a guaranteed offensive weapon.