MOSCOW – After a week of rhetorical escalation between the US and Russia -much of it conducted on Twitter – missile strikes on Syrialink>werefinally carried out on Saturday. US, UK and French forces launched attackson three sites allegedly linked to the production of chemical weaponslink>nearDamascus, as well as in the province of Homs.

Despite the pathos with which US President Donald Trumplink>announcedthe military operation, its result turned out to be less than modest.Putting aside the contradictory reports on how many missiles struck theirintended targets, they did not cause any military casualties and failed toinflict any serious damage on Syrian military infrastructure. Compared tothe recent Israeli air raid on the T-4 base, the result of the April 14strikes seems rather insignificant.

In this sense, the US, UK and French strikes were no different from themilitary action in April 2017, when after the use of chemical weapons inthe Syrian town of Khan Sheikhounlink>inIdlib province, the US bombed regime-operated Shayrat airfield.

The difference this year was that Washington blamed not only the Syrianregime for the chemical attack but also its patron, Moscow. This gave thesituation a higher degree of tension, increasing speculations about adirect clash between the US and Russia.

Direct confrontation was predictably avoided, and the whole operationseemed to be no more than a “performance”.

The party that stood to benefit the most from this situation was the Syrianregime and its allies. There was no change in the balance of power on theground as a result of the strikes and forces loyal to the Syrian regimesuffered no losses.

A few hours after the strikes, Bashar al-Assadlink> enteredsocial media politics by posting a video of himself purportedly arrivingtriumphantly at his workplace in Damascus. Local and foreign media thenshowed scenes of Syrians celebrating in the streets.

Assad seemed to weather the media speculation storm quite well, too. Lastyear, the US attacks on Shayrat military base took people by surprise andleft the international media speculating on the possibility of more seriousUS military actions against the regime. This year, after the “perfectlyexecuted” strikes – as Trump described them – it became clear that there isnothing much behind the White House rhetoric except populism.

To Assad, it is clear that the US doesn’t have any strategy to resolvethe Syrianconflictlink>andis not even able to employ an effective mechanism to preclude the use ofchemical weapons.

Last year, the Russian leadership saw the attack on Shayrat airfield as theleast damaging solution for the domestic troubles Trump was facing.

This year too, Moscow understood that the strikes on Syria are not reallyin retribution for the alleged use of chemical weaponslink>inDouma and definitely not an attempt to influence the outcome of the Syrianconflict. It was simply a demonstration of force.

What’s more, the fact that Washington was slow to undertake the strikes wasperceived in Moscow as a manifestation of weakness and indecisiveness,which only gave confidence to the Russian leadership. As a result, Moscowafforded itself a certain degree of hostile rhetoric to accompany thecoordination with Washington that ensured no damage was done to Russianassets on the ground.

Consultations between Russia and the United States appear to have takenplace in the week prior to the US strikes. The fact that Moscow hadconfidence in this coordination was reflected in the presence of adelegation link> from the ruling United RussiaParty headed by its secretary-general, Andrei Turchak, in Damascus, the daythe strikes were conducted.

In the end, these “formal” strikes against Syria were the optimal solutionfor both countries to ease tension around the situation with chemicalweapons in Douma. Moscow retained the status quo in Syria, and Washingtonformally fulfilled its promise and took a “principled” position.

But what should we make of the heated exchange of threats prior to thestrikes?

The talk about a possible escalation between the US and Russia in theMiddle East has been widely discussed since the latter’s intervention inSyria in 2015. This year’s state of the nation address which RussianPresident Vladimir Putinlink>delivered tothe Federal Assembly upped the ante, as he mentioned the possibilityof “instantretaliation link>” in case of an attack onRussia.

Retaliation threats were also issued just before the US-led strikes onSyria were carried out. The Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimovsaid that Russia would take “retaliatory measures both on missiles andcarriers that will use them”, if the lives of Russian troops wereendangered.

If we take into account the fact that the US administration at leasthypothetically considered the scenario of military intervention in Syria,Moscow had no choice but to bluff about “retaliatory measures”link>.

Like last year, nothing really happened after the strikes and the argumentwas that no action was taken because there was no threat to Russianmilitary facilities. Expecting a different reaction from Moscow would bereckless. Despite the emotional rhetoric, the Russian leadership is tryingnot to cross the line and provoke a conflict.

A direct confrontation with a militarily superior US-led coalition wouldmean a complete defeat for Russia in Syria, not to mention that it couldstart a global armed conflict.

It is, therefore, not surprising that Russia has also not responded torepeated Israeli air raids in Syria. Over the past six months, Israel hasconsistently targeted Syrian infrastructure and military facilities.

In September, Israeli warplanes struck a weapons development centre in Hamaprovince, a month later – an anti-aircraft battery near Damascus, and inDecember – weapons warehouses near the capital. In January and February,the Israeli Air Force struck various Syrian and Iranian military postsacross Syria. Most recently, on April 9, Israel bombed the T-4 airbaselink>inHoms province, killing several Iranian military officers. At the same time,in none of these cases did Russian air defence systems, including theS-300, the S-400 and the “Pantsir”, strike the attacking Israeli warplanes.

So clearly Russia has chosen a strategy of talking tough while making sureit does not take any risks on the ground.

That said, despite the lack of apparent escalation on the ground,rhetorical tensions should not be underestimated. There is a degree ofunpredictability in the behaviour of actors on both sides in recent months,as well as increasing disregard for internationally accepted norms andprocedures. This could prove dangerous in the future as it minimises thespace for negotiations and diplomatic settlements. – Al Jazeera