KABUL – Former UNAMA chief Kai Eide writes that the new peace plan carrieda different tone and had no “aggressive language so often heard in thepast.”
*Is Afghanistan finally at a turning point – after so many disappointmentsand wasted opportunities? *
At the Kabul Process II conference on 28 February, President Ashraf Ghaniproposed to launch peace talks with the Taliban without preconditions,offering to recognize the Taliban as a legitimate political group, andpresenting a number of significant proposals to be included in a peaceprocess.
The new peace plan was more comprehensive than anything previouslypresented and did not contain any of the aggressive language so often heardin the past. It did not offend the Taliban by calling on Pakistan to“deliver” the enemy to the negotiating table, but appealed to the Talibandirectly.
Furthermore, the peace plan was not presented as an ultimatum. On thecontrary, the document states that “the Taliban are expected to give inputto the peace-making process, the goal of which is to draw the Taliban, asan organisation, to peace talks.” In short: this was something very new!
So far there has not been any Taliban response to the plan presented inKabul. If the Taliban needs more time before responding, then I considerthat to be a positive sign. The Government and its partners have probablyspent weeks – perhaps months – developing the plan. To demand a quick andsimple “yes” or “no” from the other side would not only be unreasonable,but would contradict the tone and substance of the Kabul plan – andundermine its credibility.
In spite of its many positive elements, the plan is problematic to theTaliban. Until now, two Taliban positions have remained constant. First ofall, the Taliban has insisted on discussing with the US before conductingtalks with Afghans. Secondly, it has rejected “direct talks” with theAfghan Government, which it considers to lack legitimacy.
The rationale for talking to the US is clear: the Taliban considers theUS/NATO presence to be a foreign occupation. Its main objective has alwaysbeen to bring it to an end. Any discussion of questions of lesserimportance is meaningless if there is no US readiness to discuss thisfundamental demand.
In my opinion, there is a certain logic in the Taliban’s insistence ontalking to the US. The military strategy has primarily been formulated inWashington. The US military presence in Afghanistan has been overwhelming –at one stage reaching 100,000 troops. Even the current Afghan governmentwas established as a result of US intervention.
In light of its dominant role in determining military strategy, the USshould also accept a more prominent role in shaping the peace. US envoyshave – in the past – met with Taliban representatives in Doha and inEurope. A future US withdrawal plan cannot be determined by US-Talibandiscussions. However, the Taliban would need to understand that – under theright circumstances – there will be an end to what they see as a foreignoccupation.
A peace process will have to be “Afghan led and Afghan owned”. However, itis my conviction – based on recent discussions – that early US-Talibandiscussions could open up for meaningful intra-Afghan negotiations –including between the Taliban and the Government. If my impression iscorrect, then a more prominent US role would be a small price to pay.
I have been able to discuss with Taliban representatives – sporadically –over a period of nine years. I do not believe that the Taliban has anyambition to turn back to the dark years of the 1990s. Nor do I believe thatthe Taliban wants to isolate Afghanistan from the international community.The Taliban understands that the country needs a foreign presence andassistance to develop and prosper.
The document presented at the Kabul conference states that “we must havethe courage to listen to grievances, analyse the root causes and drivers ofconflict, and hear a diversity of proposals for reconciliation”. This is acritically important part of the proposal. Hopefully, the constructiveapproach it reflects will also guide future talks.
At this juncture there is a need for confidential exchanges more thanpublic statements; an exploratory stage that could determine if there is asufficient basis for negotiations. Such confidentiality is required toensure that each party to the conflict is given the opportunity to presentits own narrative to its own audience.
Furthermore, there will be a need for the involvement of a third party: toconvey messages at an early stage; to help shape the format and thesequences of discussions; and to find solutions to disputes that willalmost inevitably endanger the entire process.Afghanistan may be at a turning point. However, to move into a peaceprocess will require great caution, patience and flexibility.
Kai Eide is a Norwegian diplomat and writer. He was former United NationsSpecial Representative to Afghanistan and Ambassador to NATO. – TOLO News