ISLAMABAD – Whenever the lid blows off the Kashmir pressure cooker, atsunami of public fury will unleash itself. India knew it and sees it evenbetter now. If the curtain of fear falls and people take to the streets,the military will take the trigger-happy course. Either way, thestrategists in India ponder as to how and when will Pakistan respond?Islamabad has repeatedly warned the world of a nuclear war, waiting tobreak out.

Though US President Donald J Trump walked back on his mediation offer, hedeclared Kashmir as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Indianpremier Narendra Modi concurred, deceitfully. The US leader ignored humanrights violations in Kashmir, unprecedented for their scale and severityeven from the colonial-era standards.

Around the same time came the stern reminder from Prime Minister ImranKhan, “Whether the world joins us or not, Pakistan will go to any lengthsand its people will support [Kashmiris] till their last breath.”

The nuclear theatre

Delhi has taken Imran’s call quite literally. And for the first time, thecountry has officially shelved no-first-use (NFU) doctrine. Since 1999, itvowed to not nuclearize a conflict with a similarly-equipped foe i.e.Pakistan and China. Islamabad outrightly maintained otherwise. Beijing hasso far adhered to NFU.

Did Pakistan believe that India would adhere to NFU doctrine? Not really!Islamabad’s deterrence capability was evolved considering all possiblescenarios. Until January 4, 2017, the idea was part of chatter amongst thestrategic community and the media.

Indian army chief General Bipin Rawat exposed the masked reality: “The ColdStart doctrine exists for conventional military operations. Whether we haveto conduct conventional operations for such strikes are a decisionwell-thought-through, involving the government and the Cabinet Committee onSecurity.”

Fast forward to August 16, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath travelled tothe country’s only nuclear testing site to pay homage to former premierlate Atal Bihari Vajpayee and use the occasion to end India’s NFU policy.To end any ambiguity or confusion, he articulated Delhi’s revised policyvia twitter too. Evidently, India was almost ready to declare its formalshift to first-use back in 2016 when the then defence minister, ManoharParrikar, stated that India needed to take a more ‘responsible’ approach tonuclear weapons than the callous one of ‘no first use.’

If the policy of no-first-use was farce and Pakistan knew so, then whatexactly does India gain? Rajnath aims to double down on Modi’s harshnarrative against Pakistan for domestic consumption. Ideally, the doctrinalshift from no-first-use necessitates substantial changes to existingnuclear structures, deployment and command and control arrangements. Indiawon’t need much of the above, so believes Pakistani strategic community.They see Delhi’s nuclear arsenal to swell, which was estimated to be 10 or20 nuclear warheads short of Pakistan’s. Given its non-IAEA enrichmentfacilities, the stockpiles and warheads are said to be considerably higherthan otherwise estimated. The Modi government will be sanctioning thedevelopment of more delivery systems as well as warheads.

Secondly, the adoption of the first-use doctrine feeds into the Pakistaninarrative of Jammu & Kashmir being the nuclear flashpoint. Imran Khan hashammered the point repetitively at almost every opportunity of interactionwith the global leaders as well as media. The point would have echoed tooduring Modi’s meeting with Trump on August 27. The new policy neither addsto India’s options nor discomforts her enemies. In a kneejerk reflex, Chinais not going to revisit its nuclear posture.

Whither Cold Start doctrine?

It is a fundamental question to ask as to why India deserts its ingenious‘Cold State’ doctrine after investing colossal intellectual, military andmaterial resources. What rendered it obsolete? The answer lies across theLine of Control and the international border.

The Cold Start doctrine was envisaged to deny Pakistan the justification toopt for nuclear first-use through rapid, fatal but limited attacks. Indianstrategists reportedly planned to mobilize eight ‘battle divisions’,ranging 30,000 to 50,000 troops, independent armoured and mechanizedbrigades along with air force (and naval aviation if needed) for single ormultiples strikes in a limited area till the objective is achieved in aspan of 72 to 96 hours. The doctrine premised that blitzkrieg-style attackswould confuse the Pakistani force and eventually breaking their formationalcohesion and situational awareness.

Though never officially announced or publicly debated, India could not hideit from Pakistan. Islamabad prepared effective counter-measures andfashioned its arsenal to thwart the plan, fashioned after anot-so-successful strategy of Nazi Germany.

Development of tactical nuclear weapons is one of the straightforwardanswers. For instance, development of the world’s shortest-rangenuclear-capable ground-to-ground and air-to-ground Nasr missile will beused for counterforce use. Raad, Abdali and Ghaznavi are some of the manyoptions Pakistan developed to obstruct the Cold Start doctrine. Despiteconsistent and targeted shelling on Pakistani post along the Line ofControl, the retaliation India has been facing was significantly punitive.Despite terrorist attacks, which India pointedly blamed at Pakistan withoutmuch ado, the Cold Start could not be operationalized. It turned out to bea strategic liability than a trump card. The ‘surgical strikes’ were neverlaunched except in the media while the events unfolding after February 26Balakot strikes exposed further holes in Indian strategy and wartimereadiness. Rajnatht’s policy statement in Pokhran is, in fact, an openadmission that the Cold Start is too cold for India to work; thus, thecountry is opting for less ambiguous nuclear posturing.

Enter the next nuclear arms race

What has been constant all along is the army chief, Bipin Rawat, someonewho has commanded troops in the northeast as well as Jammu & Kashmir. Hisappointment was more for more political reasons than professional. The manis not retiring in December but has been tipped for elevation to ChairmanDefence Staff, an office being revived after two decades.

Bipin who admitted the existence of Nuclear Start doctrine two years agoand warned Pakistan of ‘proactive strategy options’ will now be overseeingan overtly more aggressive nuclear posture.

India’s first-use policy won’t serve its strategic objective of denyingPakistan second-strike capability. With Islamabad’s completion of thetriad, a salvo of nuclear warheads may not be promising enough for Delhi’ssafety from a thermonuclear blast. Yet still, the BJP sees nuclear weaponsas warfighting instruments instead of deterrence.

There seems no rationale for Pakistan to continue its separation policyi.e. keeping the delivery systems unarmed of the nuclear payload. Islamabadwill not only be keeping the nuclear devices launch-ready but also dulydispersed for operability.

India has initiated a new nuclear arms race; and is more capable ofdeveloping them now than it has ever been, thanks to overt westerncooperation initiated with the signing of the Agreement 123 with the UnitedStates.

BY: Naveed Ahmed