ISLAMABAD – STRATEGIC stability is considered crucial for preventing warand conflict between nuclear adversaries. It comprises of two essentialfactors: deterrence equilibrium and crisis stability.
India and Pakistan’s military buildup and technological advancements areconsidered satisfactory to maintain the Balance of Power (BoP) and nucleardeterrence equilibrium. While on the military side, nuclear capability hasplayed a vital role to ensure the strategic balance as no major war hastaken place between India and Pakistan in post 1998 era.
Therefore, it is pertinent to establish that the nuclear capability hasrestored strategic balance and maintained crisis stability in the region.Deterrence equilibrium is arduously maintained in the region but has playeda vital role in maintaining peace between two nuclear neighbors.Nonetheless, according to nuclear analysts the strategic stability in SouthAsia is fragile as just the nuclear deterrence alone is not sufficient tomaintain durable peace and stability in the region.
Challenges to strategic stability between India and Pakistan includedomestic politics, cross border tension, risk of terrorism, induction ofsophisticated technologies, India’s evolving nuclear doctrine and India-USstrategic partnership. These challenges have enhanced the fragility ofstrategic stability and complexity of nuclear deterrence in South Asia.
Growing challenges in the South Asian landscape has forced the securitystrategists to analyze the potential threats of India’s ‘shifting strategiclogics’. A recent debate on strategic landscape of South Asia revolvesaround India’s shifting nuclear policy and doctrine which can be studiedunder the twin pillars of ‘strategic ambiguity’ and ‘pre-emptive nuclearstrike’.
Nuclear doctrine of India is based on the principle of “Credible MinimumDeterrence” and Nuclear First Use. Statements by Indian scholars, formermilitary officials and extensive military buildup of its forces areexpression of emerging trends in India’s nuclear doctrine. On the bases ofrecent developments, it is anticipated that India is shifting its nuclearposture to Nuclear First Use (NFU). Secondly, it is moving from “CounterValue targets” to “Counterforce targets”.
Another recent development is that India is deviating from Credible MinimumDeterrence and opting for credible deterrence. However, Indian disguise wasrevealed internationally when Vipin Narang at Carnegie InternationalConference in March 2017 hinted towards potential change in India’s nucleardoctrine. For reference Vipin Narang used excerpts from the book of formerIndian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon.
One might wonder if the shift in India’s No First Use policy or othernuclear policy developments should come as a surprise for Pakistan. Theanswer would be that these discoveries by International Community didn’tcome out as a surprise to Pakistan for India’s stance on use of nuclearcapability against the biological and chemical nuclear weapon has alreadyquestioned the status of “Nuclear First Use” posture.
It is also important to note that India’s history is full of contradictoryremarks. Such as the fact that initially India denied the existence of ColdStart Doctrine (CSD) but in 2017 Indian Chief of Army Staff Bipin Rawataccepted that India is working to operationalize its CSD.
More importantly, in article 2.3 of India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND)adherence to the principle of Credible Minimum Deterrence is claimed butIndian military build-up and technological developments e.g. Missiledevelopment and Proliferation (Prithvi, Agni, Brahmos, Nirbhay), BallisticMissile Defence System (BMD), Space capabilities ( its Cartosat-2 Seriesfor Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) , Fleets of SSBN and SSN(Arihant class and Akula Class respectively) clearly negate the article 2.3of its DND. India’s shifting logics and technological advancementsdemonstrate that India is constantly trying to achieve escalation-dominancein the region.
The above-mentioned scenario demands to explore the impact of India’sshifting nuclear doctrine on the strategic stability of region. If India isto opt for counter force strategy instead of counter value strategy it willhave to achieve considerable quantitative and qualitative arms superiorityover Pakistan. This would increase the defence production gap betweennuclear rivals and instigate the arms race in the region.
Secondly, nuclear CBMs and proposal of establishing Strategic RestraintRegime will face a serious blow if any such move of shifting nuclearstrategy by India is to be made. Lastly, if India is to go for a nuclearshift it will have serious implications for the strategic stability withinthe South Asian region as it would lead the region towards crisisinstability. However, the ambiguous nuclear posture and claims from theIndian side regarding the shift in the nuclear doctrine need to beclarified to avoid the risk of miscalculation.
Given the circumstances it is inevitable for Pakistan to take followingsecurity measures to ensure its security: First, developing and maintaininga second strike capability; second, acquiring Ballistic Missile System;third, development of offensive as well as defensive cyber- warfarecapabilities. Most importantly, South Asia demands a practical approach toprevent conflict escalation through initiating dialogue process andestablishing Arms Control Regime.
To conclude, it is vital that nuclear doctrines should not be based onambiguous principles in order to avoid the risk of miscalculations. Thus,the pragmatic approach in South Asian strategic landscape would be theestablishment of nuclear risk reduction measures.
Asma Khalid–The writer is senior Researcher at Strategic Vision Institute,a think-tank based in Islamabad.