Times of Islamabad

Operation Kabaddi : Indian Army aggressive plan to reconfigure LoC, capture Pakistan Army 30 posts in Kashmir region

Operation Kabaddi : Indian Army aggressive plan to reconfigure LoC, capture Pakistan Army 30 posts in Kashmir region

NEW DELHI – In the summer of 2001, the Indian army planned a massive andunprovoked assault against Pakistan. The plan – Operation Kabaddi – calledfor altering the geography of the Line of Control (LoC) and capturing morethan 25 Pakistan Army posts, a new book by Happymon Jacob reveals.

The book titled *Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-PakistanEscalation Dynamicslink*interviewedtwo senior retired officers of the Indian Army who divulged details aboutthe military operation.

According to an excerpt of the book published on *scroll.inlink*theIndian army planned to capture 25-30 Pakistani Army posts in the region ofKashmir. The posts would be captured in multiple phases to overrunPakistani defences.

According to the book, the outline of the aggressive operation were drawnup in June 2001, barely two years after the end of the Kargil conflict.

The meeting was held between three senior officers of the Indian army: thenewly appointed general officer commanding Northern Command of the Indianarmy Lieutenant General Rostum K Nanavatty, director general of militaryoperations Lt Gen Gurbaksh Singh Sihota and the then Indian army chief GenSundararajan Padmanabhan.

Gen Nanvatty argued that “they had to do something to radically change thepayoff structure for Pakistan”, and the Indian army chief gave the greensignal for ‘Operation Kabaddi’, telling them to be prepared to carry outthe operation in due course.

In the words of Gen Nanavatty, “we were required to be ready to executeoperations as planned on orders any time on or after September 1, 2001. Butthere were no ‘start’ and ‘finish’ dates”.

There exists no clarity whether there was political clearancefor the operation, with Gen Nanavatty saying “only army HQ can answer thequestion as to whether the planned operations had the sanction of thegovernment. As far as Northern Command was concerned, we had the approvalof army HQ”.

“It was not a single, coordinated operation to commence on a prescribeddate. There was no mathematical distribution of tasks to formations andunits,” added Nanavatty.

According to the book, Nanvatty was called in early September, askingwhether the plans were ready, to which he responded all they required was astrike order from the army Hq.

However, the 9/11 attack on the twin towers in New York took place whichchanged the geopolitics of South Asia, meaning the plan never went ahead.

“Perhaps there was a small window of opportunity to carry out the operationimmediately after 9/11 when Pakistan had not yet been drafted as anAmerican ally in its war against terror. That window was never taken,” thebook states.

*The excerpt of the book appeared on scroll.inlink*