ISLAMABAD- For decades Islamabad’s Afghanistan policy was built on a simple, if risky, premise: shape outcomes in Kabul to secure a compliant neighbour, protect Pakistan’s western flank and blunt what it saw as Indian influence. That calculation rested on using political, tribal and sometimes covert ties to influence Afghan power brokers — including elements of the Taliban — while hoping the benefits would outweigh the blowback at home. The U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 fatally rewired that calculus. The Taliban’s takeover eliminated Pakistan’s old bargaining chips and replaced them with a new reality: a neighbour that now has the leverage of sovereign control and the autonomy to pursue its own regional relationships, even when those run counter to Islamabad’s security interests. An UNGRATEFUL Attitude.
The most dangerous manifestation of this failure is the re-emergence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) sanctuaries and cross-border militancy. TTP and affiliated groups — long embedded in Afghan borderlands, with deep tribal and ideological links to sections of the Afghan Taliban — have grown bolder since 2021. Pakistan’s authorities accuse the Kabul administration of tolerating or at least failing to dismantle TTP hideouts and command nodes, a charge that intersected with several violent escalations in 2024–2025 and culminated in intense exchanges of fire and cross-border strikes in October 2025. In mid-October, Islamabad closed multiple crossings after a wave of strikes and retaliatory actions along the Durand Line. The situation briefly threatened to spiral into a wider clash before mediators stepped in.
Why did this happen? Several interlocking reasons explain the shift from “influence” to “quagmire.” First, ethnicity and networks matter. The Pashtun hinterland straddles the Durand Line; familial, tribal and religious ties bind fighters and commanders across the border. This “Pashtun brotherhood” complicates any clean separation between Afghan Taliban authority and Pakistan’s internal security threats — militants can withdraw between jurisdictions with relative ease and local populations are ambivalent about handing over kin to distant state authority. Second, factional politics inside the Taliban matter. Kabul is not monolithic: the Kandahari leadership around supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and powerful patrons such as the Haqqani Network (closely linked to Sirajuddin Haqqani) have different priorities and patronage needs; some Haqqani and other factions have historically cultivated militant groups that can be used for local leverage. These factions can view groups like the TTP as useful assets, or at least sympathizers, in a region where reciprocity — not strict state discipline — often governs behaviour.
Third, there is the problem of capacity and priorities. The Taliban government inherited a fragile state with limited resources, deep humanitarian crises, factional tensions and multiple security challenges — from Islamic State Khorasan (ISKP) to anti-Taliban resistance. Dismantling TTP networks requires sustained intelligence, policing capacity and political will; those are in short supply and, in some cases, undercut by competing affiliations and incentives inside Kabul. Afghanistan’s Taliban face a choice between confronting fellow insurgents who helped them survive and risking internal fractures — a choice that, predictably, has encouraged a degree of tolerance. International reporting and Pakistani statements during 2024–2025 documented repeated episodes in which Islamabad alleged that Kabul was not acting decisively against TTP sanctuaries.
The result is a dangerous triangle: Pakistan, facing renewed domestic terror attacks claimed by the TTP, has reacted with a mix of warnings, border closures and, at times, cross-border actions. Kabul has pushed back politically and militarily at border posts, and skirmishes intensified in October 2025, producing casualties on both sides and prompting emergency mediation. Türkiye and Qatar mediated talks in late October 2025 in Istanbul aimed at solidifying a ceasefire and creating space for negotiations — a clear signal that regional actors see the stakes and are willing to step in to prevent wider war. Within weeks the main crossings were partially reopened under negotiated terms, but the underlying problem remains unresolved.
So what should Islamabad do now? There are no easy options. A full-scale war with Afghanistan would be catastrophic — it would stretch Pakistan’s resources, play into India’s hands on the eastern front, and further destabilize a region already brittle with refugee flows and economic strain. Furthermore, a large scale war would create big collateral damage that could be blown out of proportion at both domestic and international media along with rising hatred of people of Afghanistan against Pakistan that would be further exploited by the TTP and Afghans. Additionally, the blow back could significantly enhance terrorism across Pakistan as still millions of Afghan Refugees and Nationals are residing in Pakistan. Instead, Islamabad should pursue a layered strategy that minimizes escalation while maximizing pressure and practical results.
1.Regionalize the problem. Push for multilateral, high-level counter-terrorism dialogue under platforms that include China and Russia (and where possible Iran), such as the SCO framework. Internationalize the demand for Kabul to crack down on safe havens so pressure becomes diplomatic and economic, not just military.
2.Sustain quiet diplomacy and back channels. Maintain and institutionalize intelligence-to-intelligence contacts. Public posturing is politically useful at home; clandestine cooperation produces results. Continue using Qatar and Turkey as mediators where needed.
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3.Border management and technology. Strengthen layered border controls: calibrated buffer zones, greater surveillance (drones, SIGINT), improved fencing in key stretches, and selective joint patrolling agreements where political conditions permit. Technology can detect movements; human intelligence and local informants can act on it.
4.Local engagement. Reinvigorate jirgas, ulema outreach and tribal reconciliation across the Durand Line. Economic incentives, trade facilitation and targeted development projects in border districts can reduce local appetites for militancy.
5.Selective pressure and targeted covert options. Retain punitive options — targeted strikes or covert operations against confirmed sanctuaries — as a limited, last-resort tool, but calibrate them to avoid wide escalation. Pakistan must make clear the cost-benefit for Kabul: safe haven means consequences, but striking Kabul directly invites strong blowback.
6.Offer carrots, not just sticks. Trade, monetary support and political engagement can be used to extract commitments from Kabul. Pakistan should couple demands with offers that make cooperation in Islamabad’s interest: trade facilitation, development assistance and integration of border governance.
Finally, Pakistan must be honest with itself. The “no good Taliban / good Taliban” distinction has been bankrupt for years. Both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban currents have produced violence that harms civilians and erodes state capacity. Kabul’s current posture — at times ungrateful to past refuge and aid provided by Pakistani communities — reflects a new Taliban that seeks autonomy and recognition, and which will not be shaped solely by Islamabad’s preferences. Pakistan’s strategic imperative is to stop treating Afghanistan as a pliant backyard and instead engage with realism, regional partnerships, and an integrated mix of diplomacy, intelligence and measured force. That is the only way to turn a deteriorating quagmire into manageable risk. Failure to change course risks a prolonged, bloody and expensive frontier that will do no one any good.
Qaiser Bashir Makhdoom Writer is former DIG Police GB and Director FIA