ISLAMABAD – It’s been a tough few weeks for both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.Riyadh took a major blowlinktoits Aramco oil facilities earlier last month, paving the way for a “maximumpressure campaign”linkagainstTehran, and morelinkU.S.troops in the kingdom. On the other hand, Islamabad’s efforts to globalizethe Kashmir crisis are now accompanied by defense guaranteeslink to the kingdom and a rare attempt at Gulfmediationlink.For Pakistan to maintain its consistent support for Riyadh, withoutsacrificing neutrality towards Tehran, it must focus its support on Saudimilitary *“capabilities” *as opposed to *“ambitions,” *and tie futureefforts to the broader cause of regional peace.
Central to Pakistan’s success with Saudi Arabia has been its fundamentalpolicy distinction: To embrace the kingdom’s external security needswithout serving as an inlet for internal convergence. Almost all powersthat have had a say in Riyadh’s foreign policy thinking have ended up inaction. Washington’s joint military operations in Syria and Yemen, Tel Avivand Riyadh’s rampantlinkmilitarypursuits vis-à-vis Tehran, UAE’s renewed commitmentlink to containing Houthi rebels, andthe Saudi-led bloc’s collective boycottlinkofIran and allies.
For Pakistan to remain an exception, it must tailor its neutrality postureto past positions on gulf disputes – Yemen, Iraq, Libya – while advocatingpolitical solutions to hotly contested conflicts, such as Syria. Incentivesfor direct engagement are likely to appear lucrative at some point, but itis in Islamabad’s best interests to prolong this tactical detachmentposture, and avoid overstepping the bounds of regional peace.
It is important to note that both Saudi Arabia and Iran cite regionalsecuritylinkastheir rationale for divergent actions in the gulf. Thus, what qualifies asreal support to the Saudis is Islamabad’s alignment with the Saudibrand of regionalpeacelink,and not just a mere endorsement of the kingdom’s wars. Pakistan’s decisionto train and equip link RoyalSaudi Land Forces (RSLF) this week, is one example of Riyadh’s warmreception. Lt. Gen. Fahad Al-Motair, serving Commander of RSLF, lauded itas a key move towards “regional peace and stability.” Even on thediplomatic front, Riyadh has chosen not to engage Islamabad in thediplomatic and military cornering of Iran. Confrontation seldom emerges asa metric between the two.
A potential limitation on Riyadh’s reciprocity toward Islamabad is thebroadening of U.S. interests in the kingdom’s national and foreign policycalculus. Riyadh’s consistent outreachlinktowardsIndia, and recent reconsiderationlinkofthe Israeli-Palestinian peace process have all arrived at a time whenWashington’s own bilateral ties with these powers demand strategicadvances. In fact, Khan’s Saudi-Iran mediation offer is itself a result ofU.S. initiative, which is likely to keep influencing any attempts at overtengagement in the gulf. Thus, tacit U.S. approval limits the degree towhich Islamabad can pursue an independent path with Riyadh, or voice itsreservations on U.S. policy positions.
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Ultimately, too much maneuverability with Riyadh – whether in the form ofovert military support or a robust security narrative – is likely tobackfire for Islamabad. Only a future trajectory based on past successesand future implications can steer clear of Riyadh’s broader ambitions inthe Middle East. – The Diplomat
*Hannan Hussain is a policy analyst at the Islamabad Policy ResearchInstitute, columnist, and author. He is also a contributing expert onforeign affairs at Indus News, Pakistan’s globally broadcasted English newschannel.*
