Who Will Win The Nuclear War Between Pakistan and India?

Who Will Win The Nuclear War Between Pakistan and India?

ISLAMABAD: A nuclear war between Pakistan and India would be one of thegravest catastrophes of the twenty-first century, not only for South Asiabut for the entire world. Both countries are long-standing rivals,nuclear-armed since the late 1990s, and have fought multiple conventionalwars and crises since independence. Unlike Cold War nuclear rivalsseparated by oceans and alliances, Pakistan and India share a long,contested border, short missile flight times, dense populations, andunresolved political disputes. These factors compress decision-makingtimelines and magnify the risks of miscalculation, making any nuclearexchange potentially rapid, intense, and devastating.

In terms of nuclear arsenals, most credible open-source estimates suggestthat India and Pakistan each possess roughly 160 to 175 nuclear warheads,with numbers gradually increasing. India is believed to maintain a slightlylarger fissile material base and a more diversified delivery portfolio,while Pakistan emphasizes battlefield nuclear weapons and rapid escalationto offset India’s conventional military advantage. Even at the lower end ofestimates, the combined arsenals would be more than sufficient to causeunprecedented destruction across the subcontinent.

Missile capabilities play a central role in how such a conflict mightunfold. India fields a range of short-, medium-, and intermediate-rangeballistic missiles, including the Prithvi series and the Agni family, withAgni-III, IV, and V capable of striking targets deep inside Pakistan andbeyond. India has also invested in cruise missiles such as BrahMos andNirbhay, adding flexibility and precision to its strike options. Pakistan,in response, maintains its own layered missile force, including the Abdali,Ghaznavi, Shaheen, and Ghauri series, alongside the Babur cruise missile.Flight times for many of these systems are measured in minutes, not hours,drastically reducing warning and reaction windows.

Both countries claim to be moving toward a nuclear triad—land-basedmissiles, air-delivered weapons, and sea-based deterrents—but they are atdifferent stages of maturity. India has made notable progress in developinga sea-based leg through its Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missilesubmarines, which can potentially provide a survivable second-strikecapability. Pakistan, while not yet operating nuclear ballistic missilesubmarines, has pursued a sea-based deterrent through submarine-launchedcruise missiles, seeking to complicate Indian defenses and ensureretaliation capability. In a crisis, the partial and evolving nature ofthese triads could increase uncertainty rather than stability.

If a nuclear war were to break out, it would likely begin after a severeconventional confrontation, possibly triggered by a terrorist attack,border incident, or misinterpreted military movement. Escalation could berapid. Pakistan’s declared posture suggests early use of nuclear weapons ifit perceives an existential threat from India’s conventional forces,including the possible employment of short-range, low-yield “tactical”nuclear weapons on the battlefield. India, which officially maintains adoctrine of no-first-use but promises massive retaliation if struck bynuclear weapons, could respond with large-scale countervalue andcounterforce strikes.

The immediate human cost would be staggering. Major cities such as Karachi,Lahore, Islamabad, Delhi, Mumbai, and Bangalore could be targeted. Even alimited exchange involving a few dozen warheads would likely kill tens ofmillions of people within days, due to blast, heat, and prompt radiation.Hospitals would be destroyed or overwhelmed, emergency services paralyzed,and survivors exposed to long-term radiation sickness. Dense urbanpopulations and limited civil defense infrastructure would exacerbatecasualties, particularly in Pakistan’s and India’s megacities.

Beyond immediate deaths, the longer-term environmental and climaticconsequences could be severe. Scientific studies indicate that a regionalnuclear war in South Asia could inject massive amounts of soot into theupper atmosphere, leading to global cooling, disrupted rainfall patterns,and shortened growing seasons—a phenomenon often referred to as “nuclearwinter” or, in smaller scenarios, “nuclear autumn.” Agricultural productionacross South Asia would collapse, and food shortages could spread globally,affecting hundreds of millions far from the conflict zone.

Economically, both countries would face total collapse. India’s role as amajor global manufacturing hub and Pakistan’s already fragile economy wouldbe devastated. Financial markets would crash, trade routes through theIndian Ocean could be disrupted, and investor confidence in emergingmarkets worldwide would plummet. The reconstruction costs would beincalculable, and political institutions might not survive the scale ofdestruction, raising the risk of prolonged instability or state failure.

Politically and strategically, the aftermath would reshape global security.International pressure before a conflict would likely be intense, but oncenuclear weapons were used, external intervention options would be extremelylimited. Major powers would focus on containment, humanitarian relief, andpreventing further escalation, particularly if command-and-control systemswere degraded and risks of unauthorized launches increased. The credibilityof nuclear deterrence doctrines worldwide would be questioned, and globalnon-proliferation efforts could either collapse or, paradoxically, gainrenewed urgency.

In conclusion, a nuclear war between Pakistan and India would not producewinners. The combination of sizable nuclear arsenals, short missile flighttimes, evolving nuclear triads, and deep-seated political mistrust createsa uniquely dangerous strategic environment. The likely result would becatastrophic human loss, long-term environmental damage, economic ruin, andglobal repercussions lasting decades. Understanding these consequencesunderscores why crisis management, confidence-building measures, andsustained diplomatic engagement remain essential—not as abstract ideals,but as necessities for the survival of the region and the wider world.ogimageimage-name